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ABSTRACT 
ABDULBASITH, ABDULAHAD., Masters: June: 2019,   
Master of Accounting 
Title: Environmental, Social and Governance Disclosure and Profitability: GCC 
Banks’ Comparative Study 
Supervisor of Thesis: Prof. Ritab S. Alkhouri 
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between Voluntary 
disclosure (VD) and profitability of publicly traded banks operating in the GCC region 
over the period 2007-2017. We incorporate stakeholder theory and agency theory to 
gain insights about VD and profitability. Based on stakeholder theory, agency theory 
and prior studies, we developed three hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that 
Islamic banks disclose more compared to conventional banks, the second hypothesis 
states that higher the VD, higher the bank’s profitability and the third hypothesis states 
that profitable banks engage more in VD. The sample covers 57 banks, out of which, 
22 are Islamic and 35 are conventional banks. For this purpose, Environmental, Social 
and Governance (ESG) factors are considered as components of VD. Return on Assets 
(ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q are used as measures of profitability. 
To find our results, we implemented two-step system generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator. The main findings of the thesis are: First, Islamic banks have low 
ESG disclosures as compared to conventional banks. Second, ESG disclosure affects 
all the measures of profitability inversely, which suggests that ESG activities are costly 
for GCC banks. Finally, we find that ESG disclosure is positively affected by 
accounting measures of profitability (i.e. ROA and ROE). This suggests that high 
profitable banks are more visible in the market, thus, they disclose more ESG 
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information to meet the social norms, since, more information is essential to reduce the 
level of asymmetric information between managers, bank owners, and depositors.  This 
thesis contributes to the literature in different ways:  First, it enriches the literature on 
Islamic banks and VD as there is a lack of studies that dealt with this issue in the 
literature.  Second, this is one of the first studies that compared between ESG disclosure 
in both Islamic and conventional banks and its relation to bank profitability.  Third, up 
to the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study that suggested a bi-directional 
relationship between ESG disclosure and bank profitability. 
This study is useful for all stakeholders and especially investors. As markets expand, it 
is essential that sufficient information is made available to market participants in order 
to facilitate their investment and financing decisions. Given our results that ESG 
disclosure is costly for banks in the GCC, it is important that policy makers put some 
rules to encourage banks to be more socially responsible.  
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1. Introduction 
The main purpose of reporting information pertaining to a company is to reduce 
information asymmetry between the company and its stakeholders.  As stated by the 
conceptual framework of International Financial Reporting Standards, the objective of 
financial reporting is to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is 
useful to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making 
decisions about providing resources to the entity (IAS, 2018). The disclosure practice 
of companies can be divided into two categories based on disclosure requirements. The 
first one is the mandatory disclosure which obligates firms to disclose the information 
that is required by country regulators (Cooke, 1992; Adina & Ion, 2008). It might relate 
to the accounting standards regulatory institution, corporate governance codes issued 
by the financial authority, or/and the adherence to laws issued by government 
institutions. The second category of disclosure is the Voluntary Disclosures (VD) which 
is optional for companies (Cooke, 1992; Kageha, 2013). The information included in 
the VD, most prominently, pertains to social disclosures, corporate governance 
information and other financial and non-financial information that the company deems 
important for its stakeholders’ decision making and satisfaction.  
The banking sector plays a vital role in the country’s economic growth. Previous 
research suggests that financial development leads to higher economic growth (see 
Ghali (1999), Kar & Pentecost (2000), Abu-Badr & Abu-Qarn (2008), Abdelhafidh 
(2013), Paul et al. (2015) and Murari (2017)). This implies that growth, in financial 
measures, such as banks’ deposits and lending to entities cause significant growth in 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country. Thus, banks are essential players in 
the economic development of a nation, which further emphasize their role in sustainable 
economic development.  As financial intermediaries, banks play an important role in 
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the financial system of a country in the sense that they transform financial resources 
from suppliers to demanders of funds in an efficient way. By this asset transformation, 
banks enjoy sufficient control over social sustainability (Ghosh, 2014; Jeucken, 2004).  
Banks are well aware of the activities undertaken by their clients, and have the 
necessary resources attained from banks’ depositors, hence, they ought to ensure that 
funds are properly utilized. However, a client could face challenges with respect to 
her/his business due to different factors, such as, changes in government policy, 
industry norms or consumer preferences.  These challenges might lead to the inability 
of the client to pay back her/his financial obligations to the bank. This consequently 
might lead to an increase in banks’ financial risk and high nonperforming loans. 
Furthermore, at times, banks are held accountable for damages caused to the 
environment by their clients (Jeucken, 2004), as the impact on the environment caused 
by their clients might be significant (Brar, 2016). Banks, by themselves, are regarded 
as environment friendly, as they cause no direct harm to the environment through their 
activities. However, with the increase in banking operations, their immense use of 
resources (electricity, electronic equipment, papers, cooling systems etc.) is expected 
to increase as well, thus, a need to develop sustainable banking business is required 
(Meena, 2013). Accordingly, banks have started using E-banking facilities for their 
customers, which aims to maintain sustainability of environmental and social factors. 
This is done by reducing the amount of paper related documents and office space used 
(Brar, 2016).  Thus, some banks also go “Green” in their operations which intends to 
safeguard the environment and preserve the natural resources (Rajesh & Dileep, 2014). 
The banking sector in the GCC has seen moderate growth throughout the years and has 
been one of the significant contributors to the gross domestic product after oil and gas 
sectors (KPMG, 2017). Many banks in the GCC have started several initiatives to 
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protect the environment. For example, financial institutions in the UAE have adopted 
green finance initiative as part of sustainability development. Out of the 79 financial 
institutions, 48% provide green products/services (Salama, 2017). Qatar and Bahrain 
have taken steps toward initiating green finance through Qatar Central Bank and the 
Ministry of Finance (Perumal, 2017: Yousif & Ibrahim, 2018). One of the leading banks 
in Oman namely, bank of Muscat, has been lauded for its commitment towards green 
services in corroboration with International Finance Corporation. (“Bank Muscat 
Committed to Sustain Green Environment”, 2017). The Central Bank of Saudi Arabia, 
also has intended to join the sustainable banking network to promote green finance and 
is a member of Green Finance Study Group which aims to mobilize green finance 
(“Green Finance Progress Report”, 2017).  
The majority of banks in the GCC are also active contributors to social activities, they 
offer donations and work for the benefit of the local communities (Chintaman, 2014). 
Moreover, there has been a tremendous reform in the governance practices of GCC 
banks. The main focus was on board membership, executive compensation, roles & 
responsibilities of shareholders, board committee, external audit and disclosure (Ghosh, 
2018). However, it is unclear to what extent GCC banks are affected by this reform.  
This thesis highlights some important components of VD namely, Environment, Social 
and Governance (ESG) aspects, as undertaken by banks operating in the GCC region. 
It intends to determine if these voluntary ESG information are disclosed in banks’ 
annual reports and/or other published sources. This helps in understanding the current 
situation of VD among the banks of emerging markets of the GCC.   Moreover, as the 
GCC financial sector incorporates Islamic, as well as, Conventional banking systems, 
this study seeks to examine differences (if any) among both types of banks in terms of 
ESG disclosure practices. 
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1.1 Background of Study 
1.1.1 Purpose of the Research 
One of the main purposes of Voluntary Disclosure (VD) requirements, especially 
among banks, is to facilitate market participants’ ability to assess bank activities and 
practices, since the banking sector is usually deemed as opaque to outsiders (Hirtle, 
2007). It is also emphasized that comprehensive, timely, informative and credible 
information disclosures reduce the vulnerability of banks toward crisis (Tadesse, 2006). 
However, these reporting practices might differ from one geographical setting to 
another, as they differ in terms of cultural, social, economic and legal systems 
(Hawashe & Ruddock, 2014). Researchers have found that high VD is related to bank 
size, board size, ownership structure, financial leverage and profits (Rogosic, 2014; 
Hossain & Reaz, 2007; Khan & Abera, 2016; Achoki et al., 2016; Kilic, 2015; Mardini, 
2015).  Therefore, the first aim of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which GCC 
banks disclose voluntarily; Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) related 
information, and to investigate the main determinants of ESG in GCC banking sector. 
Similarly, researchers have shown inconclusive results with respect to Islamic banks’ 
level of VD. Various studies used different determinants and investigated their effect 
on VD made by IBs. Some researchers found VD to be affected by corporate 
governance (CG) mechanisms (Neifar & Jarboui, 2018). Others found that the main 
determinants of VD were; the influence of the relevant public (size of Muslim 
population), the presence of the Shariah Supervisory Board, to be positive determinants, 
while the level of political and civil repression as negative determinants (Farook et al., 
2011). Furthermore, studies found current and future financial performance, company 
size, accounting standards, and auditor type had positive effect on VD (Mallin et al., 
2014; Platonova et al., 2018; EL-Halaby & Hussainey, 2015). However, other studies 
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found no significant relationship between the VD and determinants including; 
profitability, auditor type, ownership structure and company size (Farook et al., 2011; 
Nugraheni & Anuar, 2014; Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Anuar et al., 2009). In addition, 
numerous studies concluded that the IBs perform very poorly in terms of VD. For 
instance, Hassan & Harahap (2010) inferred from their results that the majority of IBs 
do not consider VD as an important issue. Similar findings are observed by Mallin et 
al., (2014), Halaby & Hussainey (2015) and Al-Shammari (2013). Past studies also did 
not pose a concrete evidence as to whether IBs’ purpose of establishment is compatible 
with their actual operations. 
Consequently, the lack of conclusive results discussed above, motivate our research to 
investigate whether the level of VD by Islamic banks is more than that of conventional 
banks. In this thesis, we will investigate whether IBs adhere to their main purpose of 
establishment, as a more socially responsible bank compared to its conventional 
counterpart (Aribi & Gao 2010). This leads to our research’s second aim which is, to 
determine if there are any differences between conventional and Islamic banks in terms 
of ESG.  Furthermore, as many researchers found that VD might be costly for banks, 
and their costs do not warrant or match the benefits from them, this research investigates 
whether banks that disclose more information perform better than banks that provide 
less information. 
More specifically, our research aims to answer the following questions: 
1. Is there a difference between Islamic and Conventional banks’ ESG levels?   
2. Does ESG improve banks’ profitability?  
3. Does profitability determine ESG in GCC banks? 
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1.2 Contribution and Significance of the Study 
There are four main goals to this thesis:  First, the thesis will examine the extent to 
which GCC banks disclose voluntarily; Environmental, Social, and Governance related 
information.  Second, to examine if ESG disclosure affects the profitability of GCC 
banks.  Third, to determine whether profitability influences banks’ decision to disclose 
such information. Finally, to examine if there is any difference in ESG information 
disclosure between Islamic and conventional banks. By making such comparison, we 
can answer the concern; do Islamic Banks (IBs) fulfill their purpose of existence by 
disclosing more information about ESG to the public as compared to their conventional 
counterparts?   
This study is useful for investors, banks, and policy makers.  It is important to investors 
as it guides them in their investment and financing decision making process. As markets 
expand, it becomes essential for investors to have sufficient information in order to 
facilitate their savings and investment decisions.  More information is essential to 
reduce the level of asymmetric information between managers, bank owners and 
depositors.  The financial crisis of late 2007-2008, affected adversely the financial 
systems, involving banks, supervisory units, governments, businesses, and savers.  As 
a consequence of this crisis, the trust in the financial systems and mainly banks were 
affected (Alandejani et al., 2017).   Therefore, to preserve trust, more and highly 
transparent information is essential (Rawlins, 2008; Schnackenberg & Tomlinson, 
2016).   
In addition, the financial crisis reinforced and renewed the attention of practitioners, 
policymakers and academics of the functioning of banking business models.  At the 
core of this attention is directed toward the effect of corporate social responsibility on 
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financial performance of banks. Therefore, this study will have policy implications to 
regulators of the banking sector in the GCC countries. It is expected to assist them to 
formulate policies based on the level of disclosures made by banks, such as setting up 
new policies that would lead to greater board monitoring, which in turn leads to 
increased VD (Cheng & Courteney, 2006).  
This research is also beneficial for Islamic Banks (IBs) as it helps them review their 
position in terms of VD and take necessary actions to reduce information asymmetry, 
to increase the trust and confidence among their investors, managers, and other 
stakeholders.  
Although there is an increasing attention given to the subject, studies on the relationship 
between VD and profitability of banks is still limited (Wu and Shen, 2013). There are 
only few studies that look at the difference between Islamic and conventional banks in 
their level of VD and its effect on profitability (Aribi & Gao, 2010).  Another important 
implication of this study is to enrich the literature on banks’ VD and the effect of 
disclosure on banks’ profitability. 
1.3 Scope of the Study 
This study is based on all listed banks in the GCC countries that are active for the period 
2007 to 2017. The sample includes both Islamic and Conventional banks listed in 6 of 
the GCC stock exchanges (Qatar Stock Exchange, Dubai Financial Market, Abu Dhabi 
Stock Exchange, Muscat Securities Market, Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), Bahrain 
Bourse and Kuwait Stock Exchange). One of the main reasons for choosing the GCC 
countries is that they share similar economic, social, and cultural characteristics, hence 
it is easy to generalize the results within these nations. Moreover, these countries are 
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the hub of IBs as they own at least 42.3% of the total world IB assets (Islamic Financial 
Services Board, 2017).  
This thesis, will provide a short glimpse of IBs in order to comprehend the idea behind 
their operations. Although it is important to understand how IBs differ from CBs, 
however, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explain in-depth, the operations of IBs 
and their differences to those of CBs.  According to Arif (1988), IBs have few unique 
features that make them different from CBs, such as; IBs are interest free banking 
system, serve many purposes, is not limited to commercial gains and is strictly equity-
oriented. The concepts of IBs are vast and are critically discussed in more details by 
various authors (e.g. Iqbal & Molyneux, 2016; Chong & Liu, 2009; Visser, 2013; 
Asutay, 2012).  
Various studies have been conducted covering different aspects of comparisons 
between Islamic and conventional banks. Some researchers did not find any substantial 
differences among the two types of banks in terms of profitability and liquidity 
(Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013; Samad, 2004); and stability during the financial crisis 
(Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013; Altaee et al., 2013; Kassim and Majid, 2010).  Other 
researchers, however, found IBs to be more stable during the period of crisis, and are 
less risky as compared to CBs (Hamdi et al., 2017, Rosman et al., 2014; Rajhi & 
Hassairi, 2013; Pappas et al., 2012). Elbadri & Bektas (2017), on the other hand, found 
that CBs are more stable compared to IBs. The present thesis focuses on another aspect 
of comparison which includes the VD made by both types of banks, study their 
determinants and the effect of VD on their profitability. 
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1.4 Outline of the Research 
The thesis is structured as follows: In the first section, we provide background 
information which includes purpose of the study and research questions, followed by 
contribution and significance of the study and scope of the study. The second section 
will review the relevant research related to VD, provides a brief discussion about 
demographics of GCC banks, CSR and profitability in banks, and will review the CSR 
practices in Islamic banks. Subsequently, theoretical framework is established with 
emphasis on the motives behind CSR disclosures and its possible relation with 
profitability. Based on the past research and established theories, we develop our 
hypotheses. In the third section, we outline research methodology and explain the 
research methods used to collect data, the models used to test the hypothesis, diagnostic 
tests to validate the models and ensure reliability and finally, definitions of the variable 
are presented.  In the fourth section, we present the main results of the tests, analysis 
and discussion of the results are also provided in this section. The final section will 
present the summary and the main conclusions of the thesis. In addition, this section 
will discuss the important theoretical and managerial implications, will outline the main 
limitations and provides proposals for future research.  
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2. Literature Review 
This section discusses the past research with regards to VD, a review of demographics 
of banks in the GCC followed by CSR and profitability in banks. Firstly, CSR and 
profitability of banks in general is discussed. Secondly CSR in Islamic banks is 
discussed. Since, this study incorporates ESG as measure of VD, the closest studies 
related to this concept are discussed in this thesis. CSR and ESG are interchangeably 
used in this study as suggested by Fulton et al. (2012). Some of the studies highlighted 
in this section reflects different approaches used to study this relationship.  
2.1 Voluntary Disclosures (VD) 
As mentioned earlier, VD refers to all the relevant information that are voluntarily 
reported by companies, above that which is mandatory required by regulatory bodies 
(Cooke, 1992; Kageha, 2013). It is at the discretion of the management to disclose 
supplementary information, which could be either financial or non-financial, with the 
aim to provide better understanding of the company’s activities (Barako et al., 2006). 
Since the mandatory information is not always sufficient to highlight all the 
undertakings by the firm, it is important to consider reporting voluntary information 
which is expected to enhance the image of the company. This information includes 
social, environmental, financial policy, investment policy, research and development, 
and other similar disclosures that are not necessarily aimed at profit making (Hamrouni 
et al., 2015). Some of the most common adopted  measures of VD include;  
environmental, social, corporate governance, risk, financial and non-financial 
information, future prospects, corporate, strategic, management forecast, financial and 
capital market and other relevant disclosures (Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Al-
Shammari, 2013; Janadi et al., 2013; Neifar & Jarboui, 2018; Mardini, 2015; Appuhami 
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& Tashakor, 2017; Ho & Taylor, 2013; Wang et al., 2013; Akra & Ali, 2012; Al-Hadi 
et al., 2017; Hung et al., 2018). 
 Voluntary Disclosures (VD), affect the company’s value as perceived by market 
participants.  According to previous research, high levels of VD create value for the 
company from its investors point of view, since it helps them in their financing and 
investment decisions (Akra & Ali, 2012; Barth et al., 2016; Lee & Yeo, 2016; 
Verbeeten et al., 2016; Reitmaier & Schultze, 2017; Al-Shaer, 2018). This study will 
add to the literature on VD by applying the VD on the banking sector of the GCC taking 
into consideration the different types of banks operating in the region (Islamic and 
conventional).   
This study covers three types of VD, namely, Environmental, Social, and Governance 
(ESG). The ESG disclosures are the most utilized VD in past studies, thus, they are 
among the most important VD that pave the path for investors to examine the quality 
of firm management (Lee & Moscardi, 2018). Using ESG therefore, will allow us to 
compare our results to the previous research papers on ESG/CSR VD. 
2.2 Demographics of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Banks 
The GCC member countries include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Gross Domestic Products (GDP) of these countries 
depend largely on oil and gas, with more than half of the contributions to their GDPs 
come from the oil and gas sectors. Other main sectors contributing to their GDP, 
although comparatively small, include; the construction, the tourism and the financial 
sectors (Pietro et al., 2015). The financial sector in the region is dominated by banks, 
which are mostly domestically owned, as entry barriers to this sector are quite high.  
There are limits on foreign ownership in all the GCC countries except Bahrain (Pietro 
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et al., 2015). Furthermore, the banking sector in the GCC focuses mainly, in their 
investments and lending, on construction, real estate and consumer loans. With regards 
to ownership, the banking sector in Oman and Saudi Arabia is mostly quasi government 
owned, while in the UAE, the majority of banks are government owned. In the GCC 
region the banking sector is highly concentrated. The three largest domestic banks own 
at least 50-90 % of the total banking sector assets (Al-Khouri, 2012). Amongst them, 
Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain have the most highly concentrated banking sectors (Pietro 
et al., 2015; Olson & Zoubi, 2008).  
In this study, the importance of the non-oil sector, specifically, the banking sector is 
highlighted due to the various challenges and trends facing these countries. On a 
common ground, all the GCC countries, lately suffered from poor liquidity due to the 
drop-in oil prices, and the increase in government spending to cover their deficits (i.e. 
overall country expenditures exceed the revenues earned), which consequently led to 
reduction in banks’ deposits (Guastella & Menghi, 2016). Other challenges relate to the 
decline in the quality of assets possessed by the countries due to reduced economic 
activity and the growing competitive pricing among banks (Guastella & Menghi, 2016).  
Each of the GCC countries undergoes different political settings and circumstances, 
and face problems specific to their geographical regions as well. For instance, Saudi 
Arabia is being over dependent on oil and aims to diversify its sources of revenue; UAE 
faces below par profitability from government owned companies, which could lead to 
fiscal and financial risks; Qatar has made huge spending with the aim of diversification 
but that might lead to excessive cost spending and inflation; Oman aims to solve the 
challenges relating to banking liquidity, economic growth and diversification; Bahrain 
faces political issues and rising debt and Kuwait is investing heavily in diversification 
and private investments (Guastella & Menghi, 2016). Consequently, the predicted 
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solution to most of the problems facing the GCC nations could be tackled by increasing 
investments in the private sector, by focusing on growth of Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises, and by improving the liquidity and solvency of the banking sector in the 
region (Guastella & Menghi, 2016).   
The banking sector in the GCC, is dominated by IBs followed by CBs. According to 
the Islamic Financial Services Board (2017), the Islamic financial sector is considered 
significantly important in a country if the total IBs’ assets are more than 15% of the 
total regional banking assets. As of the year 2016, IBs’ assets in Saudi Arabia constitute 
around 51% of total bank assets, followed by Kuwait (39%), Qatar (27%) and UAE 
(20%). However, IB assets in Bahrain and Oman were below the 15% threshold 
(Islamic Financial Services Board, 2017). Furthermore, in Global perspective, the total 
amount of assets owned by IBs in the GCC for the year 2016 amounted to 
approximately, USD 650.8 billion, which represent around 42.3% of the total IBs’ 
assets worldwide (Islamic Financial Services Board, 2017).   Appendix A, table A6, list 
the total number of banks listed in the six GCC stock exchanges.  
2.3 CSR and Bank Profitability 
Cornett et al. (2016) examined the relationship between profitability of banks and their 
CSR scores. Their sample included the US commercial banks, covering a period of pre 
and post financial crisis of 2007. The authors adopted various profitability measures, 
such as, Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), operating profit, and 
Tobin’s Q, to ensure that their results are not biased by a single measure of profitability. 
Whereas, to measure the CSR score of banks, the authors adopted the ESG 
scores/ratings made by MSCI ESG STATS database. The researchers found financial 
profitability to be positive and significantly related to CSR in both, the pre, as well as, 
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the post financial crisis period. They found that larger banks are more socially 
responsible than smaller banks, especially after the financial crisis. This served as a 
reminder for banks and their stakeholders to enhance their social activities. Shen et al. 
(2016) conducted a study on banks from 18 countries covering a period of 9 years 
started from year 2000, to examine the difference between CSR active banks and CSR 
inactive banks. Their profitability measures included ROA and ROE, while their CSR 
ratings from FTSE4GOOD were used as a benchmark. Their findings varied across 
different countries, in Australia, Canada, Ireland and the UK, banks with CSR activities 
performed better as compared to those without CSR. While, other countries in the 
sample showed CSR banks to lag behind in terms of profitability as compared to non-
CSR banks. In another study, Matuszak & Rozanska (2017) examined the impact of 
CSR disclosure on financial performance on a sample of Polish banks over the period 
2008-2015. Their main measures of profitability were ROA and ROE, while the level 
of CSR disclosure was measured using content analysis approach, different from 
previously mentioned studies who used database ratings. They found a positive but 
insignificant relationship between Banks’ CSR disclosures and their profitability. 
However, they found that bank size and leverage have greater predictability of bank 
profitability. A positive CSR impact on profitability was also found by Gillan et al. 
(2010), Wu & Shen (2013), Awan & Nazish (2016), Ashraf et al. (2017), Niresh & 
Silva (2018), Maqbool & Zameer (2018). 
On the other hand, Deutsch & Pinter (2016) examined the link between social 
profitability and financial profitability of Hungarian banks. They found a negative 
relation between CSR and profitability. Other studies like Chakroun et al., (2017) 
examined the determinants of CSR disclosure in Tunisian banks. They found financial 
profitability to be negatively related to CSR disclosure. They suggested that older banks 
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gave more importance to CSR disclosures in order to improve their corporate image. 
Similar results were found by Ng et al. (2016) that banks with lower profitability tend 
to make greater ESG disclosures, possibly to improve their reputation and attract 
customers.  
Furthermore, the study by Fijalkowska et al. (2018) examined the relation between CSR 
profitability and financial performance, using a sample of banks from Central and 
Eastern European countries. They found no relationship between social disclosure and 
profitability, consistent with the results found by Soana (2011) and Stroughal et al. 
(2015). The authors argued that the most plausible reason for the non-existence of any 
relation between the CSR and profitability could be due to factors related to cultural, 
financial, economic and to other regulatory environment of the sample countries. The 
markets in these countries did not perceive social disclosures to be a competitive 
advantage for banks, but only as an extra cost directed towards social activities, a view, 
which contradicts that of stakeholder theory as will be discussed in later section.  
A summary of the literature review for the relationship between CSR and profitability 
of banks can be found in Appendix A, table A1. 
2.4 CSR in Islamic Banks 
A special emphasis is given to CSR in Islamic banks, since, the activities of these banks 
are influenced by religion (Islam) and the socio-economic elements are essential part 
of this religion (Aribi & Gao, 2010). In order to understand the Islamic perspective of 
CSR, it is important to understand the concept of accountability, social justice and 
ownership (Zubairu et al., 2012).  First, the concept of accountability in Islam states 
that Mankind has been provided by various blessings from The God, and they will be 
held accountable for how these blessings are utilized. Based on accountability, a person 
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is rewarded or punished. Thus, these perceptions are supposed to guide the actions of 
every Muslim, be it individual or an organization (Maali et al., 2006). Second, social 
justice refers to providing individuals equally with what they deserve, while distributing 
financial benefits to the society (Zubairu et al., 2012). For instance, the concept of 
yearly Zakat (mandatory charity) to assist the needy, and to alleviate poverty in the 
society, prohibition of Riba (interest) to avoid exploitation of people, and fair dealings 
with employees are all examples of social justice incorporated in Islamic teachings 
(Maali et al., 2006). Finally, the concept of ownership and trust states that God is the 
ultimate owner of everything and people are trusted to utilize these resources but in 
accordance with the guidelines issued by God (Zubairu et al., 2012).  From among many 
guidelines, most are related to the use of resources for the benefit of society and to 
preserve the environment. Furthermore, in the context of disclosures, the society has 
the right to be informed about the actions of the company and their effect on society 
and its surroundings (Yusoff et al., 2013). Hence, it is important to explore what past 
researchers have found with regards to CSR disclosure in Islamic banks and how they 
compete with conventional banks in this aspect. 
Zubairu et al. (2012) conducted a study to explore the CSR practices in the Islamic 
banks of Saudi Arabia. Their findings suggest that IBs have a very poor disclosure 
especially those related to Sharia (Islamic law) requirements. They stated that IBs in 
Saudi Arabia are more similar to conventional banks, as both of them disclose similar 
items, related to debtors and corporate governance. Their study however, was based on 
data collected for the years 2008-2009. Aribi & Gao (2010) compared the CSR 
disclosure among Islamic and Conventional financial firms in the Gulf region for year 
2004. They found Islamic institutions to disclose more information as compared to their 
counter parts. The type of information they looked at, are those required by the 
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Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
standards. Apart from those items required by AAOIFI, both types of institutions had 
very similar CSR disclosures.  
Similarly, a study by Mallin et al. (2014) examined the relation between CSR and 
profitability of IBs across 13 countries. Their findings suggest that IBs CSR disclosures 
include more items than those which are required by AAOIFI. They also found CSR 
disclosure to have positive association with the profitability of IBs, however, their data 
was limited for years 2010 and 2011. Platonova et al. (2018) studied the relationship 
between CSR disclosure and financial performance among GCC (excluding Oman) IBs 
covering an extensive sample period of 15 years (2000-2014). Their results also indicate 
that CSR disclosures have positive impact on profitability of IBs. The authors 
highlighted two important implications of the results. First, the level of CSR disclosures 
among IBs is below expectations. Second, they suggested that the majority of 
information disclosed by IBs pertained to financial information directed towards 
shareholders, and less information was disclosed that would be interesting to other 
stakeholders. Ahmed et al. (2012) also found profitability to be higher among high CSR 
disclosure banks in Bangladesh. On the other hand, Nobanee & Ellili (2016) found that 
IB profitability is not affected by CSR disclosures. Their findings also suggest that CSR 
among conventional banks of UAE was higher than those of IBs. Important 
implications derived from their study is that IBs disclose less information due to the 
less pressure exerted on them as they comply with Islamic principles and ethics, while, 
CBs face high leverage and financial constraints. Consequently, Islamic banks are less 
responsive to demands of their stakeholders. Mosaid & Boutti (2012) tested the 
relationship between CSR and profitability, and found no relationship between them. 
Similar result was found by Masruki et al. (2012) on a sample of Malaysian banks. 
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Their results show that bank size affects CSR disclosure. However, the study included 
only 3 variables to test the determinants of CSR and the sample period was short as 
well, which restricts generalization of results. Appendix A1, table A2 summarizes the 
literature of CSR in Islamic banks. 
From the above analysis of prior research, it can be ascertained that there is a bulk of 
research pertaining to CSR in banks, but there is dearth of research that examines; CSR 
in GCC banks, the bi-directional effect of CSR and profitability, and 
similarities/differences among the IBs and CBs in terms of CSR- profitability 
relationship. Since, GCC countries are the hub of IBs as they own at least 42.3% of the 
total world IB assets (Islamic Financial Services Board, 2017) and they have CBs as 
well, it is commendable to make the study in this geographical setting. Thus, the present 
study is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature and enhance the literature on CSR 
disclosures in IBs and CBs.  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
Past researches have adopted various theories to explain the relationship between VD 
and different corporate characteristics. Under this section, the most prominent among 
those theories are discussed which include; Stakeholder theory and Agency theory. 
Figure 1 depicts a summarized framework for the discussed theories. 
3.1 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder’s theory introduced first by Ansoff (1965) and developed further by 
Freeman (1984), is the most prominent theory used in the accounting literature to 
explain the social, environmental and governance behavior of companies (Gray et al., 
1995). Conventionally, the stakeholder theory stems from the view of the company’s 
management who is anxious about the success of their organization (Gray et al., 1995). 
It examines the relationship between business activities and its effect on various 
stakeholders (Mohamed & Faouzi, 2014).  
A Stakeholder is defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the firm’s objective” (Freeman, 2010; Roberts, 1992 p. 3). The 
operations of an organization affect several stakeholders, such as; shareholders, 
employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, competitors, government agencies, 
regulators, public interest groups, stock markets and the general public (Mohamed & 
Fouzi, 2014). Consequently, all stakeholders can be regarded as contributing to the 
existence of the firm or act as catalyst for the firm’s success/failure by providing them 
with critical resources and in turn expect their interests/expectations to be fulfilled (Hill 
& Jones, 1992; Mohamed & Fouzi, 2014). Therefore, one of the main objectives of the 
company is to be able to balance the conflicting demands of various stakeholders 
(Roberts, 1992).  Moreover, the complex activities of banks require the creation of 
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intangible resources as good reputation and trust over time. Although to preserve 
reputation can be costly in the short run, it might mean long-term profitability 
(Galbreath & Shun, 2012).   
Stakeholder theory in the context of social disclosure states that the shareholder value 
creation, being the core objective of any organization, cannot be achieved except 
through satisfying the needs of other stakeholders (Foster & Jonker, 2005). This would 
mean that if a company wants to maximize shareholders’ value, then it has to 
simultaneously fulfill the requirements of its other stakeholders, through VD. However, 
certain stakeholder groups might exert significant influence over the management of 
the company, in such a way that they are compelled to prioritize their requirements 
(even if they are related to social disclosures) in terms of reporting and disclosures 
(Pirsch et al., 2007).  Subsequently, such influence of certain groups over the 
management nullifies the normative approach of stakeholder theory which states that 
the interests of all stakeholders are to be treated equally (Jones & Wicks, 1999).  On 
the other hand, VD reduces the agency costs and improves the relationship with other 
stakeholders.  According to Jo and Hajoto (2012), there is an evidence of a missing link 
between corporate governance and the improvement in company’s profitability. 
Furthermore, researchers found that company’s economic performance (both past and 
current) affects their social activities and disclosure. Firms with better profitability tend 
to implement a better social responsibility program to increase their level of earnings 
(Pirsch et al., 2007).  Similarly, the instrumentalist view of stakeholder’s theory 
suggests that a company should emphasize on improving economic performance. 
Company’s management tends to focus on elements of social activities that are directly 
related to improving economic performance (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Pirsch et al., 
2007). For instance, management usually offers bonus-based incentives to their 
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employees as an appreciation to their work, which motivates them to improve their 
productivity, leading to enhanced profits (Brammer & Millington, 2008).   Literature 
found a positive effect of ESG on worker productivity and on the ability of the company 
to maintain qualified employees (Asrar-ul-Haq, et al., 2017; Celma-Beinages et al. 2016 
and Heal, 2005).  Empirical evidence confirms the positive relationship between human 
capital and bank financial performance (Menton and Bontis, 2013; Esteban-Sanches et 
al., 2017). 
3.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is based on the principal-agent paradigm wherein the shareholders (the 
principal) authorize the managers (the agent) to act on their behalf, such that their 
welfare depends on the actions of managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In most of the 
organizations, managers have significant control over the company’s resources, and 
since the information about resources can reach the shareholders only through the 
management, it is highly likely that managers misuse these resources to pursue their 
personal goals, even at the cost of shareholders’ returns (Brammer & Millington, 2008). 
However, from the principal’s point of view, it is impossible that the agent will make 
accurate decisions without incurring any costs. These costs are referred to as the agency 
costs which include, the cost to monitor the activities of the agent, the cost of bonding 
the agent to the company usually as a result of contractual obligations, and the cost of 
reduction in principal welfare as a result of the agent decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  
Moreover, the managers always strive to reflect themselves as acting in the best interest 
of the shareholders. This is achieved through disclosures made in the reports available 
to shareholders, being the primary source of communication about the firm (Ness & 
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Mirza, 1991). Consequently, this theory suggests that managers will only disclose 
voluntary information if it benefits them i.e. the cost of disclosure is less than the benefit 
achieved from it. Since increased VD reduce information asymmetry, consequently, the 
agency cost is reduced, it can be concluded that the managers will make disclosures to 
enhance firm value (Ishak & Al-Ebel, 2018; Friedman, 2007). On the other hand, the 
social responsibility commitment is also considered an agency issue because managers 
might have interest in over investing in social responsibility in order to achieve personal 
benefits from the reputation they receive, at the cost of shareholders (Barnea and Rubin, 
2010).  Thus, firms which meet social needs are in disadvantage given the cost they 
incur; thus, they tend to have lower profits (Jensen 2001, Simpson and Kohers, 2002).  
 
  
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework. 
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4. Hypothesis Development 
Under this section, we use past studies and theories to develop our hypothesis. First, 
we predict the disclosure levels among IBs and CBs. Second, we predict the 
relationship between profitability and CSR.  
4.1 IBs vs CBs ESG Voluntary Disclosure (VD) Levels 
Islamic banks are known for their adherence to Islamic principles and morals while 
conducting business.  Thus, they are expected to provide sufficient information to their 
stakeholders about financial, non-financial, social and environmental activities 
(Ibrahim et al., 2013). Considering their object of existence and their conscious effort 
to make social disclosures (Aribi & Gao), it is expected that IBs maintain higher 
disclosure levels as compared to CBs. However, according to stakeholder theory, 
typically firms would make higher disclosures to increase their profits, and since the 
motive of CBs is to increase profits (Cerovic et al., 2017) they are expected to have 
high disclosures as well.  
Furthermore, Empirical studies suggest that there is no significant difference between 
IBs and CBs in terms of CSR disclosures (Aribi & Gao, 2010; Zubairu et al. 2012). 
Since, this study is conducted on banks operating in the GCC region, and the major 
population among these countries is Muslim (“Global Religious Diversity”, 2014), we 
adopt the argument of ‘relevant publics’ (Newson & Deegan, 2002) and evidence of 
Farook et al. (2011) to infer that Muslim population has positive impact on disclosure 
levels in IBs. Hence, IBs tend to disclose more information as compared to their 
counterparts. Thus, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: IBs have higher level of ESG compared to CBs.  
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4.2 Bi-directional Relationship Between ESG and Profitability 
According to stakeholder’s theory, ESG enhances firm’s profitability keeping 
stakeholders informed about activities that are most relevant to them (Foster & Jonker, 
2005; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Pirsch et al., 2007). In addition, agency theory states 
that managers would disclose more information in their reports to show their 
profitability (Ness & Mirza, 1991), as well as to reduce agency costs which would 
otherwise be high due to information asymmetry (Ishak & Al-Ebel, 2018; Friedman, 
2007). Hence, managers increase the disclosures to enhance the value of the firm.   
Previous empirical research found conflicting results on the relationship between VD 
and bank profitability.  Most of the empirical results show a positive impact of VD on 
bank profitability (Cornett et al., 2016; Shen et al., 2016; Matuszak & Rozanska, 2017; 
Bussoli & Conte, 2018), while other studies found a negative impact of VD on 
profitability (Deutsch & Pinter, 2016; Chakroun et al., 2017).  In addition, other 
researchers found no relation between VD and profitability (Fijalkowska et al., 2018).  
This leads us to our second hypothesis: 
H2a:  Higher the ESG higher the bank’s profitability 
With regards to the converse relationship between the two variables, the stakeholder’s 
theory suggests that firms with high profitability tend to involve more in social activities 
(Pirsch et al., 2007). Agency theory, on the other hand, suggests that managers of 
profitable firms will disclose more information to ensure continuance of their position 
in the firm and to have better compensation (Inchausti, 1997, as cited in Hossain & 
Hammami, 2009). They also aim at improving their reputation and strengthening their 
position in the market (Habbash et al., 2016). Empirical studies show mixed results for 
this relationship.  Jizi et al. (2014) found positive impact of profitability on VD, while, 
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Bussoli & Conte (2018) found negative impact of profitability on VD. Other studies 
found no relationship between VD and profitability (Hossain & Hammari, (2009). 
Therefore, following a positivistic approach, we hypothesize the following: 
H2b:  Profitable banks are expected to engage more in ESG 
  
26 
 
5. Research Methodology 
This research is basically of quantitative, empirical and deductive nature, wherein, it 
aims to predict and test the main hypotheses based on relevant theories and past 
research. It is followed by conducting statistical tests to confirm or reject the derived 
hypothesis. For ESG information, this study uses the secondary sources of data mainly 
annual reports and sustainability reports published by GCC banks on their websites. 
Financial information is collected from Bloomberg database. Furthermore, this paper 
adopts the ESG checklist developed by Eikon Thomson Reuters which serves as a base 
for the index we developed for the ESG reporting. Although the use of Thomson 
Reuters ESG ratings are not utilized much in the scientific research yet, but some of the 
studies have readily adopted these ratings (Dell'Atti et al., 2017; Bussoli & Conte, 
2018). Since, the ratings on the database were not updated, their index was used as a 
guide to individually collect the data from the annual reports of banks. The index is 
divided into Environmental, Social and Governance metrics which consists of more 
than 400 items. Our constructed index uses 115 most relevant items to the banking 
sector, out of the 400 items listed by Eikon database. Our checklist consisted of 115 
ESG indicators divided by dimension: 33 items for environment disclosure, 38 items 
for social disclosure and 44 items for governance disclosure (see detailed breakdown 
of each dimension in Appendix A, table A3 & table A4).  
Under this section, we outline the research method implemented, the sample and data 
collection, the methodology we employ, and variable definitions. 
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5.1 Research Method 
5.1.1 Sample and Data Collection 
There is a total of 68 banks listed on the respective stock exchanges of GCC countries. 
Due to unavailability of data, 11 banks were removed from the sample, which left us 
with a total sample of 57 banks (see Appendix A, table A5). The sample consisted of 
35 conventional banks and 22 Islamic banks. For each bank 11 years (2007-2017) 
sample period was taken into consideration which resulted in a total of 627 
observations. Furthermore, the data regarding ESG was collected from the news 
section, annual reports, governance reports and sustainability reports of banks. All the 
reports were retrieved from companies’ websites. 
5.1.2 Content Analysis 
This study adopts the content analysis approach in order to measure the ESG disclosure 
levels in the banks’ reports. This method has been applied by several researchers related 
to empirical research on CSR (Dias et al., 2016; Haniffa & Cookke, 2005; Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008; Pinto et al., 2014; Mallin et al., 2014 and Platonova et al., 2018). 
Under this method, if the items listed in the index are present in the reports of the 
company then it is considered as the item have been disclosed and a score of one (1) is 
given to that company for that particular item, otherwise a score of zero (0) is given 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Subsequently, after searching for all the items in the index, 
the scores are aggregated to reach the total ESG score for each bank. The aggregated 
scores are further averaged to gain accurate insight about the level of disclosures made 
by the banks (Dias et al., 2016). The following formula was used to evaluate each 
company: 
𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡  =   
∑𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑛
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Where, n = total number of items listed in the index 
Xit= the item in the index for bank i at time t. Takes a value of 1 if an item is disclosed, 
0 if item is not disclosed 
5.2 Methodology 
This study adopts two equations, since it tends to examine the bi-directional relationship 
between ESG and profitability. Thus, the following models are developed:  
Model1: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝐵 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Model2: 
𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝐵 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Where, 
Performance– profitability of banks 
ESG – ESG disclosure made by banks 
Size – Bank size 
Leverage – financial leverage of banks 
Liquidity – liquidity of bank 
Macroeconomic – Macroeconomic indicators of country 
Age – Bank age 
Board Size – Size of board serving the bank 
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Credit risk – default on debt of bank 
GovtOwn – Government ownership in the bank 
IB – Islamic bank dummy variable 
In the first model, profitability is the dependent variable, whereas, ESG is the 
independent variable while, firm size, leverage, liquidity, macroeconomic, firm age, 
board size and credit risk are the control variables for each firm i at time t, and Islamic 
bank is used as dummy variable. In the second model, ESG is the dependent variable, 
profitability is the independent variable, while, firm size, leverage, liquidity, firm age, 
board size and government ownership for each bank i at time t, are control variables 
and Islamic bank is used as dummy variable. Each of the variables are explained in the 
next subsection.  
5.3 Definition of Variables 
Bank profitability: In the first model, bank profitability is the dependent variable, 
whereas, in the second model, it is the independent variable. We use three different 
measures of bank profitability to ensure robustness of the results. The first measure 
included in this study is, an accounting measure, Return on Assets (ROA), which is 
measured as net profits divided by average of total assets. It is one of the most common 
measures used in past studies as a proxy for profitability and has become an important 
indicator of bank’s profitability (Golin & Delhaise, 2013). It reflects the banks’ ability 
to generate returns by exploiting its assets (Bidhari et al., 2013). The second measure 
used in this study is, also an accounting measure, Return on Equity (ROE), calculated 
as net profits divided by average common stock equity. It reflects the bank’s ability to 
generate returns from the capital provided by the owners (Bidhari et al., 2013). Many 
researchers adopted ROA and ROE simultaneously in their studies (see Dietrich & 
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Wanzenried, 2009; Tan & Floros, 2012; Petria et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2016). The third 
measure is Tobin’s Q used to reflect market-based performance of banks and has been 
adopted by many researchers (see Yermack (1996), Guest (2009), Harjoto & Jo (2011), 
Alkhatib & Harsheh (2012) and Hummel & Schlick (2016)). It is calculated as market 
value of equity divided by book value of equity. It reflects the stock market perception 
reflecting the current and future expected value of the bank (Bidhari et al., 2013). 
Results are reported for all the three measures of profitability.  
ESG (ESG): ESG is independent variable in the first model, whereas, it is used as 
dependent variable in the second model. The main explanatory variable used in first 
model is the ESG disclosure score. It includes Environmental, Social and Governance 
related voluntary information disclosed by banks and typically regarded as a reflection 
of firms’ transparency and accountability (Hahn and Kühnen, 2013; Li et al., 2018). As 
mentioned earlier, data for ESG was collected using a content analysis approach and 
the main source of data were; company websites’ news section, annual reports, 
corporate governance reports and CSR reports. Some studies have adopted readily 
available ratings from specialized agencies like Bloomberg who compile ESG 
information for large number of companies (Fatemi et al., 2017; Dell’Atti et al., 2017; 
Bussoli & Conte, 2018). However, due to unavailability of complete data on GCC 
banks, information about ESG was individually collected.  
5.3.3 Control Variables 
Firm Size (Ln (Total Capital) - TC): is calculated as the log of total capital.  Bank size 
is an important variable that affects both; the profitability of banks, as well as, their 
CSR disclosure levels. There are various measures that can be used to proxy for bank 
size (Schildbach, 2017). Some of the measures include; total assets (Masruki et al., 
2012; Martínez-Ferrero, 2015; Ben-Amar, 2017), total deposits (El-Bannany, 2007), 
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total employees (Hummel & Schlick, 2016; Lee et al., 2016), total sales (Niresh & 
Thirunavukkarasu, 2014), market capitalization (Naser et al., 2006), and total capital 
(Yermack, 1996; Conyon et al., 2001; Holm & Scholer, 2010). Among the several firm 
size measures mentioned, the most commonly used measure is the total assets or log of 
total assets, however, this measure is problematic and is unstable over time. The most 
prominent problem posed by total assets is that it fails to take into consideration many 
factors such as; the diversification of banks or individual bank’s business model; the 
nature of risk surrounding them; the economic impact on banks; and the different 
accounting treatment of securities such as derivatives and bonds (Schildbach, 2017).  
In contrast, the most stable measure of bank size is total capital. It provides a value of 
the bank as a measure of their size instead of taking into consideration the combined 
volume of their transactions (as in the case of total assets). Furthermore, total capital is 
not affected by the differences in the type of organization, their business models, and 
the financial system surrounding them (derivatives, bond market and so on). Thus, total 
capital, due to low fluctuations over time, tends to provide a better picture of the bank 
size as compared to other measures of firm size (Schildbach, 2007).  
Past researchers state that large firms face fierce pressure from the stakeholders and 
consequently are expected to disclose more information about their ESG or CSR 
activities (Martínez-Ferrero, 2015; Amar et al., 2015; Nugraheni & Anuar, 2014). 
However, with regards to profitability and size, some studies show a negative effect of 
size on profitability (Naceur, 2003; Alkassim, 2005; Pasiouras & Kasmidou, 2007), 
while others found no significant relationship between size and profitability (Ramadan 
et al., 2011; Niresh & Thirunavukkarasu, 2014; Petria et al., 2015). There is also an 
evidence by researchers of a positive relationship between size and profitability 
(Alkassim, 2005; Davydenko, 2010; Anbar & Alper, 2011; Gul et al., 2011). Thus, bank 
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size is used as a control variable for ESG score and profitability and is calculated as log 
of total capital instead of dollar terms to be consistent with other variables. 
Leverage (Debt Ratio - Lev): It is used as a control variable to reflect the effect of debt 
ratio on the profitability and ESG.  Following Brammer & Millington (2004); a nd 
Mardini (2015) we calculate leverage as total debt to total assets. Firms with high level 
of debt are expected to disclose more ESG information to satisfy their stakeholders’ 
demand for transparency through disclosure (Solomon & Lewis, 2002).   
Past studies found a positive relationship between leverage and the level of firm 
disclosure (Naser, 2006; Clarkson et al., 2008; Mallin & Ow-yang, 2009; Mardini, 
2015). Furthermore, researchers suggested that high debt levels lead to lower firm 
profitability, thus, associating leverage with firm performance levels (Degryse & 
Ongena, 2001; Samiloglu & Demirgunes, 2008; Asimakopoulos et al., 2009; Ahmad et 
al., 2015; Mathuva, 2015). Therefore, leverage is included as a control variable for both 
ESG and bank profitability.  
Liquidity (Loan to deposit - LD):  bank liquidity is associated with its profitability and 
social disclosure. It is measured as the ratio of total loans to total deposits (Dang, 2011). 
Banks with high loan to deposit ratio tend to have lower CSR activities (El-Bannany, 
2007; Wu & Shen, 2013), whereas, loan to deposit is positively associated with bank’s 
profitability (Dang, 2011). 
Age (Age): Bank age is measured as the log of difference in date of incorporation and 
2017 (date of data collection).  We predict a negative relationship between age and bank 
profitability.  This is supported by the argument that as the bank grows older, the bank’s 
risk factor as seen by investors is reduced, thus, implying lower required rate of return 
(Pastor & Veronesi, 2003). Other studies supporting the inverse relation between firm 
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age and profitability found that corporate governance deteriorates over time, CEO pays 
rise, growth slows down, cost of sales and other overhead expenses go up, thus, 
resulting in reduced profits (Holderness, 2009; Loderer & Waelchli, 2010).  
However, Malkawi & Pillai (2018) found a significant and positive relationship 
between firm age and profitability. Older banks are expected to voluntarily disclose 
more information related to social responsibility as they tend to maintain their 
accumulated reputation by engaging in CSR activities (Monteiro & Aibar-Guzman, 
2010; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Withisuphakorn & Jiraporn, 2016; Mdolo et al., 2018). 
However, some studies found no significant relationship between firm age and its CSR 
disclosure (Sukcharoensin, 2012; D’Amico et al., 2016; Mdolo et al., 2018). 
Board Size (BoardSize): Following Guest (2009), we calculate board size as the log of 
number of board members on the board of directors of a bank.  Board size is an 
important corporate governance variable that affects bank profitability as well as CSR. 
It is predicted that large board size tends to improve the overall bank profitability, as 
greater collective information is gathered by the board which is essential for the bank 
(Lehn et al., 2003). Previous research found that large board size improves profitability 
of firms (Adams & Mehran, 2005; Coles et al., 2008).  
However, it is also argued that a large board might face several problems such as 
difficulties in assembling for meetings, too many conflicts, and a slow decision making, 
leading to firm inefficiencies (Jensen, 1993; Rao et al., 2012). Several studies support 
the negative relationship between board size and profitability (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Cheng et al., 2008; Guest, 2009).  
On the other hand, Siregar & Bachtiar (2010) state that board size has positive effect 
on CSR which is also supported by the results of Esa & Ghazali (2012), Frias-Aceituno 
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et al. (2013) and Kilic et al., (2015). While Fuente et al., (2016) found no relation 
between board size and CSR disclosure. 
Government ownership (Govtown): government ownership is taken into consideration 
to assess its effect on the CSR disclosure levels. It is suggested that CSR practices are 
expected to be higher in companies with major government ownership, as compared to 
those with non-governmental ownership (Esa & Ghazali, 2012). Several studies found 
evidence of a positive and significant relationship between government ownership and 
CSR disclosure (Ghazali, 2007; Said et al., 2009; Li & Zhang, 2010). Thus, it is used 
as control variable for ESG disclosure.  
Credit Risk (Loan Loss provision to Total Loans – CR): Credit risk is measured as 
provision for loan loss to total loans (Petria et al., 2015). GCC banks are known to 
spend huge amounts on provision for loans loss (White, 2010), which implies that 
default rate is expected to be quite high among these banks. Thus, higher accumulation 
of unpaid loans eventually leads to lower returns for banks (Athanasoglou et a., 2009). 
For this purpose, it is important to include a credit risk measure to control for the 
profitability of the GCC banks. Any changes in banks’ credit risk would reflect 
fluctuations in banks’ loan portfolio, which further affects banks’ profitability (Cooper 
et al., 2003; Shen et al., 2009). We predict that credit risk will have negative effect on 
GCC banks’ profitability, as the provisions for loan loss are high among these banks 
(White, 2010).  
Macroeconomic Indicators (GDP growth – GDPG & Inflation – Inf): Apart from the 
bank-specific factors mentioned earlier, there are some external factors that affect the 
bank profitability. Following Petria et al., (2015), we use the growth in Gross Domestic 
Product (GGDP) and inflation rates (Inf) to reflect the macroeconomic variables that 
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are more likely to affect the bank profitability (Sufian & Chong, 2008; Aburime, 2008). 
We expect that an increase in the economic activity leads to an increase in banks’ 
profitability. GDP growth would lead to an increase in bank deposits and loans, which 
would lead to a positive impact on bank profitability (Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2009; 
Petria et al., 2013). Similarly, an increase in inflation rates leads to an increase in 
interest rates on loans, which in turn have a positive impact on banks’ profitability (Tan 
& Floros, 2012; Petria et al., 2015). 
5.3.4 Dummy Variable: 
Islamic Bank: We create a dummy variable in order to check if there are any differences 
between Islamic and conventional banks in the relationship between ESG and bank 
profitability.  The dummy variable takes a value of 1 for Islamic banks and zero for 
conventional ones.  
5.4 Data Diagnostics Tests and GMM Models 
We first apply the ordinary least square (OLS) method as previously applied by Bussoli 
& Conte (2018) (results are included in Appendix B, table B1 & B2). Under OLS 
regression, the variance of the error term is assumed to be constant (Williams, 2015). 
However, due to variations in the sample such as; Islamic & conventional banks and 
large & small banks, there can be variations in the error term as well, causing 
heteroskedasticity. Thus, we test for heteroskedasticity to confirm if our data is affected 
by heteroskedasticity or not.  
We apply the “estat hettest” command incorporated in Stata which uses the Breusch-
Paigan/ Cook-Weisberg tests to detect for heteroskedasticity. First, we run the OLS 
regression on equation 1 previously discussed, where profitability as dependent 
variable, ESG as independent variable, control variables and the dummy variable. Our 
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results show large Chi-square value which indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity 
(Williams, 2015) (results are provided in Appendix B, table B3).  
In addition, we examine the bi-directional relationship between profitability and ESG, 
which causes endogeneity (simultaneity) problems in the model (Geweke, 1990; Ullah 
et al., 2018). In order to verify the existence/non-existence of endogeneity, we use the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test incorporated in Stata (Davidson & MacKinnon, 
1993). According to Ullah et al. (2018), “if a single variable in the econometric 
specification is endogenous, obviously, researchers need to implement a superior 
estimation technique that provides consistent estimates than OLS (p. 19). Thus, we 
check our explanatory variables for endogeneity and our results show that most of the 
variables are endogenously determined. First, we test the model with profitability 
measures ROA and ROE, and we find that Total Capital, Leverage, Loan to Deposit, 
credit risk and GDP growth are endogenously determined. Second, we test the model 
with profitability measure Tobin’s Q and we find similar results, except that ESG and 
firm Age are also endogenously determined (Results as highlighted in Appendix B, 
table B4). 
Thus, our model suffers from heteroskedasticity and endogeneity problems which 
makes OLS regression inconsistent and inefficient (Baum et al., 2003; Davidson & 
MacKinnon, 1993). 
 In order to deal with the problems of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity, researchers 
have suggested the use of General Methods of Moments (GMM) model (Baum et al., 
2003; Tamazian & Rao 2010). Past researchers have proven that system GMM is more 
precise estimator compared to first difference GMM. They suggest that first difference 
GMM suffers from downward bias due to the negligence of persistency in the 
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dependent variable ((Blundell and Bond, 1998; Heid et al., 2012). Therefore, we adopt 
the dynamic two-step system GMM suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) using the preconfigured method in Stata. We also use the 
robust standard errors prescribed by Windmeijer (2005) to ensure the efficiency of the 
estimator.  
Although there are other methods that can be used to deal with the aforementioned 
problems such as the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. However, GMM has 
advantages over 2SLS approach in the sense that it is able to deal with endogeneity 
problem with internally generated instruments instead of external instruments or mere 
experimentations. In addition, GMM includes prior year dependent variable value as 
one of its regressors, thus providing dynamicity to the model (Ali et al., 2018).  
To verify the consistency of GMM estimation, two conditions are required to be 
fulfilled. The first condition relates to the serial correlation of the residuals in the first 
difference and the second difference. The first difference in residuals should be serially 
correlated (AR1) while the second difference in residuals should not be serially 
correlated (AR2) (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Ali et al., 2018). The second condition 
deals with the validity of the instruments, which is tested using the Sargan test of over 
identifying restrictions (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995 and Blundel 
& Bond, 1998). Results on Sargan test should reject the null hypothesis of 
overidentifying restrictions, in order to confirm the validity of instruments (Ali et al., 
2018; Elsayed & Paton, 2005). Both of these tests are conducted to ensure the validity 
of GMM for our data model and are discussed under the results (regression) section. 
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6. Empirical Results 
This section contains detailed explanation of our findings. We explain our results 
using; descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, t-statistics, graphs, tables and 
regression analysis using GMM estimator. 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in table 1. The total number of 
observations after adjusting for unavailable data is 616 observations. Results indicate 
that the ESG score among the GCC banks is as low as 2.6% disclosures, which implies 
that most banks in the GCC do not consider ESG as an integral part to their 
organization, hence, they inadequately disclose voluntary information related to ESG. 
However, it is also evident that the maximum disclosure made in terms of ESG equals 
57.4 %, with an average VD made by the GCC banks being 14.8% of the total items in 
the index.  Therefore, we can say that the overall disclosure related to environment, 
social and governance activities in the banking sector of the GCC is very low.  This 
result is consistent with the findings of Kamla (2007) and Mallin et.al (2014), who 
found low levels of environmental related disclosures by Arab companies including 
banks. Garas & ElMassah (2018) also found that GCC firms have a mean of 19.18 % 
ESG disclosure level. Thus, as suggested by Khamis & Semlali (2010), the transparency 
among the GCC banks should be given attention and must be enhanced. 
Table 2 and Table 3 illustrate the descriptive statistics for our sample of both 
conventional and Islamic banks, respectively. The total number of observations for 
conventional banks is 385, with a total of 35 banks, while, there are 242 observations 
under Islamic banks with a total of 22 Islamic banks. Considering the maximum ESG 
disclosure scores by banks, it is observed that conventional bank has had the greatest 
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amount of disclosure (57.4%) as compared to Islamic banks whose highest disclosure 
was at 53%. Even On an average (mean), conventional banks have greater disclosure 
(15.1%) as compared to their counterparts whose disclosure level is 14.3%. Our results 
are consistent with the findings of Haniffa & Hudaib (2007) (in UAE, Bahrain and 
Kuwait) and Zubairu et al. (2012) (in Saudi Arabia), who found poor disclosure 
practices by IBs. The findings are inconsistent with the findings of Zainal et al. (2012), 
Anuar et al. (2009) and Aribi & Gao (2010) who found Islamic institutions to have 
higher disclosures compared to their counterparts. The differences in results might due 
to the number of items used in the indexes they implemented, the sample time, and of 
course the sample of banks under investigation.  For example, Anuar et al (2009) 
studied Islamic bank disclosure only in Malaysia, while Aribi and Gao, looked at 
disclosure for the year 2004 only. It could also be possible that Islamic banks in 
Malaysia or Bangladesh disclose more ESG items than those in the GCC countries. The 
results are also against the presumption that Islamic banks tend to disclose more ESG 
information as compared to conventional banks. As our results suggest, overall, 
conventional banks in the GCC disclose more information voluntarily (57.4%) than 
Islamic banks.  Both types of banks have a minimum disclosure of 2.6% and 3.5% 
respectively, which means that regardless of the purpose of establishing banks, there 
are certain banks in both categories that do not adhere to disclose much voluntarily 
information about ESG.  
 Figure 2 depicts the trend of ESG disclosure levels across all banks in the GCC, and 
compares between IBs and CBs disclosure levels. We found an increasing trend in ESG 
disclosure levels over time across both types of banks. For most of the years included 
in the study, CBs tend to contribute more towards ESG, as consistently being above IBs 
in terms of disclosure levels. However, during the year 2012, IBs had significantly 
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greater disclosure levels as compared to CBs. This could be due to the closure of Islamic 
windows in conventional banks in Qatar (Ibrahim, 2013) that lead IBs to increase their 
VD to attract stakeholders and build trust. Simultaneously, the establishment of Islamic 
banking system in Oman by late 2012 (Basu et al., 2015) could also cause increased 
disclosure levels. As evident from figure 3, only Qatar and Oman show an increasing 
trend during the year 2012, disclosure in the other GCC countries remained steady.  
Looking at the other variables, results show that conventional banks are larger than 
Islamic banks, and more profitable, as measured by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q.  Both 
types of banks have similar financial leverage. Banks’ liquidity, as measured by total 
loans to total deposits for Islamic banks is less than that of conventional banks. This 
means that on average, Islamic banks provide more loans as compared to their deposits 
as compared to conventional banks, which results in high total loan to total deposits 
ratio.  This might indicate that Islamic banks are riskier, in terms of liquidity, than 
conventional banks. Credit risk as measured by provision of loan loss to total loans 
shows the riskiness of the banks in terms of lending. From tables 2 and 3, it can be 
ascertained that Islamic banks in GCC have more bad loans as compared to the 
conventional banks. This could be due to the concept of Murabaha1 in Islamic banking 
system, which exposes IBs to credit risk when clients default on their debt (Swartz, 
2013).  
 
                                           
1“Murabaha is selling a commodity as per the purchasing price with a defined and agreed profit mark-up. 
This mark-up may be a percentage of the selling price or a lump sum. This transaction may be concluded 
either without a prior promise to buy, in which case it is called an ordinary Murabaha, or with a prior 
promise to buy submitted by a person interested in acquiring goods through the institution, in which case it is 
called a “banking Murabaha”, i.e. Murabaha to the purchase orderer. This transaction is one of the trustbased 
contracts that depends on transparency as to the actual purchasing price or cost price in addition to common 
expenses” (see AAOIFI, 2010, p. 129). 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (all banks) 
 
ROA ROE TobQ ESG Total 
Capital 
Leverage Loan/Dep Credit 
Risk 
Mean 1.708 11.665 1.096 0.148 8.348 7.700 97.339 1.12 
Median 1.658 12.844 1.059 0.130 8.323 7.624 96.904 .75 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.435 10.135 0.158 0.083 1.128 2.601 32.427 1.33 
Minimum -7.169 -136.2 0.552 0.026 5.55 1.572 0.663 -3.11 
Maximum 16.430 39.726 2.219 0.574 11.06 21.737 487.220 10.1 
Count 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 627 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (Conventional Banks) 
 
ROA ROE TobQ ESG Total 
Capital 
Leverage Loan/Dep Credit 
Risk 
Mean 1.86 12.5 1.102 0.151 8.38 7.71 96.15 .989 
Median 1.77 13.10 1.06 0.139 8.34 7.62 98.52 .719 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.45 10.48 0.16 0.087 1.08 2.49 18.53 1.05 
Minimum -7.16 -
136.02 
0.551 0.026 5.88 1.57 44.084 -.95 
Maximum 16.42 34.794 2.219 0.574 10.99 21.737 159.266 6.56 
Count 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 
  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (Islamic Banks) 
 
ROA ROE TobQ ESG Total 
Capital 
Leverage Loan/Dep Credit 
Risk 
Mean 1.451 10.324 1.08 0.143 8.288 7.672 99.231 1.33 
Median 1.464 11.93 1.052 0.122 8.257 7.585 94.138 .847 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.376 9.413 0.153 0.075 1.2 2.772 46.667 1.66 
Minimum -
5.727 
-
46.513 
0.73 0.035 5.55 1.98 0.663 -
3.118 
Maximum 7.90 39.726 1.84 0.53 11.06 21.658 487.22 10.1 
Count 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 
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Figure 2. ESG score trend 
 
6.2 T-test for Equality of Means 
This section helps us in answering our first research question: Is there any difference 
between Islamic and conventional banks in their ESG levels? 
To see if the differences between Islamic and conventional banks are statistically 
significant, we run the t-test of the difference in means.  Table 4 shows the results of 
the independent t-test used to compare the mean score of Islamic and conventional 
banks. Results of the table indicate that for our sample, conventional banks are 
significantly larger and more profitable. Conventional banks also have higher financial 
leverage than those of Islamic banks. Contrary to our expectations, it is interesting to 
note that the level of disclosure by conventional banks is higher than that of Islamic 
banks. On the other hand, Islamic banks have higher loan to deposit ratio as compared 
to that of conventional ones. This implies that Islamic banks in our sample are less 
liquid than their conventional counterpart.   
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Based on the above analysis, we can reject our first hypothesis, which states that IBs 
have higher level of ESG as compared to CBs in the GCC. However, as highlighted 
earlier, our findings suggest that IBs have lower average ESG disclosures as compared 
to CBs. Thus, we reject our first hypothesis H1. 
 
Table 4. Independent sample T-test for equality of means (assumed equal variance) 
Variables t Sig. (2-tailed) Mean 
difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
TobQ .882 0.378  .0114 .0129 
ROE 2.086 0.038** 1.823 .874 
ROA 2.652 0.009* .308 .1161 
ESG 3.018 0.003* .021 .0069 
TC 2.508 .013** .249 .0995 
Lev 1.547 0.123 .353 .229 
LD -1.752 0.2471 -5.659 3.229 
CR -3.186 .0015* -.345 .108 
      *significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% Conventional 1 and Islamic 0 
       TobQ: refers to Tobin Q, ROE is return on equity (Net income/equity), ROA is Return on Assets (Net 
income/Total Assets), ESG is  Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, Lev is 
financial leverage (Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits) and CR is the credit risk 
(provision for loan loss/total loan). 
 
6.3 ESG across GCC Countries 
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of ESG disclosure practices in the GCC banks. 
We find that Bahrain leads in disclosure practices at an average disclosure level of 
17.4% followed by Qatar who has 17% disclosure level. Saudi Arabia ranks third with 
15.5 % disclosure followed by Kuwait and Oman with 14.4 % and 13.6 % disclosure 
levels respectively. The least disclosure levels were found in UAE banks with an 
average of only 12.8 %. Our results are similar to those of Khasharmeh & Desoky 
(2013) who also found lowest disclosure levels among UAE banks.  
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Furthermore, we conduct a trend analysis for each country to determine the disclosure 
practices among banks of each country across the sample period (2007-2017).  We find 
that Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE have steady disclosure levels from year 2007 
to year 2009, while Saudi Arabia disclosures went down in 2009, while Qatar has an 
increasing disclosure levels over the study period. From year 2010, all the countries see 
a tremendous increase in disclosure levels, except for UAE whose disclosures tend to 
increase from year 2011. We also noticed that for all the countries in the study the level 
of disclosure dropped for the year 2017, except for Kuwait and Qatar. 
Moreover, considering the period of crisis (2007-2008), our findings show no 
significant effect on the GCC banks’ disclosure levels. Countries that were most 
affected by the crisis were Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE (Khamis & Semlali, 2010). 
Looking at their disclosure trend, we observe a slight increase in Bahraini banks’ 
disclosure levels during the year 2008, while disclosure by Kuwaiti and UAE banks 
remain steady. On the other hand, Omani banks’ disclosure levels was reduced during 
year 2008, while disclosure by Saudi Arabian banks was improved significantly in year 
2008. Overall, all GCC banks had increasing disclosure levels throughout the study 
period.  
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of ESG across GCC countries 
 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi UAE 
Mean 0.1743 0.1437 0.1362 0.1704 0.1547 0.1271 
Median 0.1826 0.1400 0.1478 0.1815 0.1770 0.1342 
Standard Deviation 0.0476 0.0419 0.0490 0.0409 0.0457 0.0327 
Minimum 0.0993 0.0898 0.0739 0.0978 0.0703 0.0847 
Maximum 0.2372 0.1942 0.2086 0.2141 0.2094 0.1766 
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Figure 3. ESG trend across GCC countries 
 
6.4 ESG Disclosure Score 
Figure 4 illustrates the proportion of Environmental, Social and Governance disclosures 
in the GCC banks. Out of our disclosure scores, we find that Information related to 
Environment constitutes only 9% of the total disclosures made.  Social items represent 
around, 28%, while disclosure related to governance constitutes around 63% of the total 
ESG scores.  
Furthermore, we broke down each of the ESG aspects to find out the most disclosed 
items in the GCC banks. Table 6 depicts the breakdown of individual items in the ESG 
index. We found that within the environment aspect, information related to emission is 
the highest disclosed information, followed by use of resources and innovation.  It is 
apparent since GCC countries are one of the leading countries in terms of harmful gas 
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emissions (Saddam, 2012). In terms of social disclosures, the most disclosed 
information is those related to the workforce, followed by community, product 
responsibility and human rights. Our result is consistent with Ellili & Nobanee (2017), 
who found that the highest disclosure in the UAE Islamic and conventional banks, was 
related to workforce.  
With regards to governance, the most disclosed information is those related to 
management (58.5%) of the total information disclosed. This is consistent with the 
notion of the agency theory, that managers disclose information for personal gains, so 
as to achieve reputation in sight of stakeholders (Barnea & Rubin, 2010). A similar 
finding was made by Gillan et al., (2010) who suggested that managers tend to use ESG 
to improve their own welfare at the cost of shareholders. Information related to 
shareholders and ESG strategy are only 3.3% and 1.6% respectively. Moreover, figure 
5 shows the trend of ESG items across the study period. We found that all three aspects 
of ESG face a downfall in the year 2008. From year 2009 to 2017 all items constantly 
increased throughout the years  
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Table 6. ESG score breakdown 
 
Proportion of ESG items 
disclosed total 
individual score 
contributing to average 
ESG score 
Environment 8.7% 0.0129 
Resource Use 3.2% 0.0047 
Emissions 4.2% 0.0063 
Innovation 1.3% 0.0019 
Social  27.9% 0.0412 
Workforce 15.1% 0.0223 
Human Rights 0.9% 0.0013 
Community 9.0% 0.0133 
Product 
responsibility 
3.0% 0.0044 
Governance 63.4% 0.0938 
Management 58.5% 0.0865 
Shareholders 3.3% 0.0049 
ESG strategy 1.6% 0.0938 
   
Total 
 
14.80% 
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Figure 4. Proportion of ESG items 
 
 
 
Figure 5. ESG individual score trend 
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6.5 Correlation Matrix 
Table 7 shows results of the correlation between our independent variables.  It is 
important to see if we have any significant correlation between our independent 
variables, since adding two highly correlated variables in the same regression would 
result in redundant information. Our results show that all variables have weak 
correlations, which ensures that there is no issue of multicollinearity in the variables.  
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Table 7. Pearson Correlation 
Correlation ROA ESG TC Lev LD GDPG Inf Age BoardSize CR GovtOwn 
ROA Pearson Correlation 1           
Sig. (2-tailed)            
            
ESG Pearson Correlation -.044 1          
Sig. (2-tailed) .272           
            
TC Pearson Correlation .151* .064 1         
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .110          
            
Lev Pearson Correlation -.360* .127* .211* 1        
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .000         
            
LD Pearson Correlation -.012 .061 -.107* -.231* 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .763 .128 .007 .000        
            
GDPG Pearson Correlation .340* -.080** -.057 -.162* .037 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .046 .152 .000 .351       
            
Inf Pearson Correlation .134* -.205* -.073 -.090** .011 .315* 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .068 .024 .793 .000      
            
Age Pearson Correlation -.018 .007 .171* .156* -.163* -.087** .000 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .661 .863 .000 .000 .000 .029 1.000     
            
BoardSize 
 
 
Pearson Correlation -.060 .175* .086** .203* -.023 -.052 -.003 .077 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
.133 .000 .031 .000 .563 .192 .939 .054    
CR Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
-.307* 
.000 
 
.001 
.978 
-.174* 
.000 
.034 
.390 
.047 
.243 
-.148* 
.000 
-.058 
.146 
.034 
.396 
-.044 
.269 
1  
Govtown Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.104* 
.009 
.037 
.351 
-.021 
.600 
-.007 
.860 
-.058 
.150 
-.007 
.865 
.015 
.704 
-.123* 
.002 
-.030 
.450 
-.007 
.855 
1 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
ROA is Return on Assets (Net income/Total Assets), ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, Lev is financial leverage (Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), GDPG is the 
GDP growth ((GDP current year – GDP previous year)/GDP previous year), Inf is the inflation as percentage of GDP, Age is the firm age, BoardSize is no. of board members, CR is the credit risk measured as provision for loan loss 
to total loan (Loan loss provision/total loan ) and Govtown is the government ownership in the firm. 
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6.6 Regression Results 
We investigate the relationship between banks’ profitability and ESG disclosure using 
a sample of 57 banks operating in the GCC for 2007-2017 period. The measures used 
for bank profitability were ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. One of the issues confronted our 
model while implementing OLS regression, was that OLS did not control for 
endogeneity and heteroskedasticity which lead to inconsistencies in the results. As 
mentioned in the methodology section, we adopted the dynamic two-step system GMM 
estimator to get robust results. 
6.6.1. Results of The Effect of ESG on Bank Profitability: 
This section aims to answer our second research question, “Does ESG improve banks’ 
profitability?”. 
Tables 8, 9 and 10 depict the results of our econometric model (equation 1). Beginning 
with the dependent variable, ROA, we run stepwise regression adding one variable at a 
time to see the effect of adding these variables on bank profitability. Table 8, panel A 
shows the results of regressing ESG, size, lev, L/D, GGDP, and Inf. on ROA.    
Results show that bank profitability persist from the year before, however, it is 
insignificant for the second lag. Similar results were found by Al-Khouri & Arouri 
(2016) for the GCC banks and Tan & Floros (2012) on Chinese banks. The coefficient 
on the ESG disclosure Lag 1 year is negative and highly significant at 5% level. It 
implies that banks that had higher ESG disclosures in a particular year affects 
negatively their profitability in the year that follows. This could possibly be due to the 
increased burden of costs of voluntary information disclosures on the banks that affects 
their profits in the following year.  Furthermore, this result contradicts the assumption 
that current year’s ESG information disclosure helps investors in predicting the future 
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profitability or returns of the companies (Lys et al., 2015; Bussoli & Conte, 2018; Wang 
et al., 2018). Our results are consistent with Deutsch & Pinter (2016) and Chakroun et 
al. (2017), however, our results are inconsistent with past studies who found a positive 
effect of ESG on firm profitability (for example: Shen et al. (2016), Corenett et al. 
(2016), Matuszak & Rozanska, 2017).  
We also found a positive and significant relationship between size and profitability of 
banks. This implies larger banks are more profitable as compared to smaller banks, 
similar to the findings of Arouri et al., (2011) and Al-Musalli & Ismail (2012). 
However, in the context of GCC, Naceur & Omran (2011) and Tai (2015) found no 
significant relationship between bank size and profitability, while, Zeitun (2012) found 
negative relationship between ROA and bank size. 
 Results of macroeconomic variables show that inflation is consistently significant and 
positively related to profitability. This means that any increase in the inflation rate leads 
to an increase in interest rates (on given loans), which consequently would lead to an 
increase in bank profitability (Tan & Floros, 2012). However, the result is inconsistent 
with those found by Zeitun (2012) who showed a negative relationship between 
inflation and profitability of GCC banks.  
In table 8, panel B, we added bank age to see if the relationship between ESG and bank 
ROA would change.  We expected that as banks become older, they tend to disclose 
more ESG information and become more transparent.  Our results show no significant 
effect of age on bank’s profitability.  In addition, our results from panel A did not 
change as we added bank age to our regression. However, age of the bank is 
insignificant and negatively related to the profitability implying that older banks might 
not necessarily earn more profits as suggested by Pastor & Veronesi (2003). 
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Table 8, panel C, outlines the results after adding board size as an explanatory variable.  
Following previous research (Guest, 2009), we added board size as an explanatory 
variable.  We expected that board size would have an effect on ESG disclosure and 
consequently would change our results.  Our results concerning the relationship 
between ESG and bank profitability were still robust and did not change.  However, as 
we added board size, bank liquidity as measured by loan to deposit (L/D) became 
significant, and remained negatively related to bank profitability (ROA). It suggests 
that banks with high liquidity are less profitable.  This might suggest that banks in the 
GCC had high demands for loans, which forces them to resort to external source of 
funding to meet these demands, thus, increasing the cost of funding resulted in lower 
profits (Shen et al., 2009).  
In order to check if the results of the relationship between ESG disclosure and ROA 
change, and whether Loan to Deposit (L/D) proxy for credit risk, we added another 
variable namely; loan loss provision to total loans (LLP/TL) as a measure of banks’ 
credit risk.  Table 8, Panel D shows the results after adding LLP/TL as explanatory 
variable. The regression results indicated that credit risk is significant at 5% 
significance level and negatively related to bank profitability. This implies that banks 
in the GCC are generally accepting high risk in their lending, where the amount of bad 
loans was quite high, which lead to the negative affect of credit risk on ROA. Similar 
results were found by Athanasoglou et al. (2008), Shen et al. (2009) and Petria et al. 
(2015) but in different geographical settings.   
To see if there is any difference between conventional and Islamic banks in terms of 
the effect of ESG disclosure on profitability, we added an interaction variable IB. Table 
8, Panel E depicts that adding this interaction variable did not affect the results found 
in all other regression results run previously.  Thus, our results suggest that in both 
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types of banks one-year lag of ESG disclosure had a negative effect on GCC banks’ 
profitability.  Therefore, controlling for bank specific and macroeconomic indicators, 
our results show no significant difference between Islamic and conventional banks, in 
the sense that ESG is costly for both types of banks alike. 
Overall, results of table 8 show that in all our regressions, financial leverage (Lev) is 
insignificant and negatively associated with bank profitability.  This result is consistent 
with the findings by previous studies (Ahmad et al., 2015; Mathuva, 2015). GDP 
growth is positively, but insignificantly related to profitability.  Our result is 
inconsistent with that found by Al-Khouri & Arouri (2016). Banks’ age is insignificant 
and negatively related to the profitability consistent with the findings of Zeitun (2012).  
This implies that older banks might not necessarily earn more profits as viewed by 
Pastor & Veronesi (2003). Board size is also insignificant and negatively related to 
profitability. The negative relation might imply the inefficiency of board members to 
take correct decision due to lack of required skills, and an inadequate understanding of 
the banking environment, that exists among the board members in the GCC banking 
industry (OECD, 2009).  
In order to verify the absence of serial correlation and to affirm the validity of the 
instrumental variables used in the model, we perform autocorrelation tests and Sargan 
tests respectively, as proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991). As discussed under the 
methodology section, the second order correlation should be insignificant and Sargan 
test should have large chi-squared value and insignificant p-value. From the results in 
table 8, we can see that our instrumental variables are valid and the model satisfies the 
conditions for consistency in the GMM estimator employed. 
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We use two more measures for profitability, namely; Tobin’s Q and ROE. Table 9 
illustrates the results for ROE as dependent variable, as a measure of bank proftiability. 
Results from regressing our variables on ROE are identical to those found in the 
previous regression on ROA, however, the coefficients and level of significance differ 
slightly between the variables. Banks in the GCC are persistence in their profitability 
even when measured by ROE. With regards to ESG score, the large coefficient (-27.9) 
depicts huge impact of last year ESG disclosure on current year’s ROE. This could 
imply that high ESG disclosures attract capital from shareholders, but the cost burden 
is significant enough to keep the returns low, thus, lowering the overall ROE. The 
results are similar to those found by Deutsch & Pinter (2016) and Chakroun et al., 
(2017) in the context of Hungary and Tunisia banks respectively. Similar to the results 
found for ROA, credit risk affects ROE (significantly and negatively).  Furthermore, it 
can be noticed from table 9 that bank Age is significant at 5% significance level when 
board size and IB dummy variable were not included. However, after including the 
aforementioned variables, bank age becomes a weak explanatory variable for bank 
profitability (ROE). Other variables remain insignificant in explaining ROE. 
We also verified this model (table 9) using autocorrelation and Sargan tests. We found 
that the model satisfied the condition for consistency in the GMM estimator employed. 
The final measure used for profitability was a market-based performance measure 
namely; Tobin’s Q. We found that based on Tobin’s Q, a firm’s profit was independent 
of the previous year’s profits. Concerning ESG, the results are similar to those found 
for ROA and ROE i.e. significant and negative relation between ESG disclosure and 
Tobin’s Q. This could imply that the market perception is unaffected by the ESG 
activities of the bank contrary to the idea of stakeholder’s theory. The results are 
inconsistent with study of Cornett et al. (2016) who found a positive relationship 
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between Tobin’s Q and ESG. However, credit risk did not seem have any effect on 
profitability, as it is insignificant and negatively related to Tobin’s Q.  Bank size is 
significant and positively related to profitability. We also found that inflation is 
positively but insignificantly related to profitability. Finally, board size seemed to have 
significant and positive effect on profitability, consistent with Belkhir (2009). This 
could imply that GCC market perceives large board size as good indicator of banks’ 
value and growth potential.  However, other variables do not seem to have any 
significant relationship to profitability (Tobin’s Q).  
Furthermore, table 10 shows that there exists no second order correlation and large chi-
square values for Sargan tests. Thus, the estimator is consistent for the tested model. 
To sum, given our sample and controlling for bank specific and macroeconomic factors, 
our results show mainly that ESG activities is costly for the GCC banks.  ESG activities 
seem to affect bank profitability negatively the year that follows spending on such 
activities.  Furthermore, in both types of banks, Islamic and conventional ESG tend to 
have adverse effect on profitability.  Therefore, we reject our second hypothesis H2. 
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Table 8. Determinants of Profitability (ROA) 
Dep: ROA Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E 
Dependent L1 .3898* 
(.000) 
.4084* 
(.000) 
.4089* 
(.000) 
.3968* 
(.000) 
.383*  
(.000) 
Dependent L2 .0176  
(.800) 
.0191 
 (.718) 
.0163 
 (.766) 
.0131  
(.780) 
.0064 
 (.887) 
ESG 
L1 
5.681** 
(.033) 
-5.855** 
(.012) 
4.2989  
(.121) 
-5.024*** 
(.061) 
4.541  
(.125) 
-5.181*** 
(.052) 
3.262  
(.257) 
-4.467*** 
(.077) 
2.738 
 (.178) 
-3.713 *** 
(.065) 
TC .1866** 
(.036) 
.3554** 
(.028) 
.3824** 
(.038) 
.2664*** 
(.079) 
.256 
 (.107) 
Lev -.0444 
 (.348) 
-.0257 
(.596) 
-.033 
 (.520) 
-.0132 
 (.791) 
-.0155 
 (.740) 
LD -.0039  
(.166) 
-.0036 
  (.120) 
-.0036*** 
(.056) 
-.0017 
(.224) 
-.0018 
 (.166) 
GDPG .0141  
(.208) 
.0097  
(.422) 
.0106  
(.363) 
.0087 
 (.330) 
.007  
(.421) 
Inf .0101** 
(.012) 
.0104** 
 (.019) 
.0109** 
(.019) 
.0084** 
(.032) 
-.1713*  
(.008) 
Age - -.427 
 (.221) 
-.2401  
(.601) 
-.1124  
(.801) 
-.171  
(.657) 
BoardSize - - -.3738  
(.681) 
-.0934  
(.920) 
.111  
(.886) 
CR - - - -.3228** 
 (.023) 
-.3301*  
(.005) 
IB - - - - -1.574 
 (.391) 
AR1 -3.097* 
(.0020) 
-2.8669* 
(.0041) 
-2.844* 
(.0045) 
-3.152*  
(.0016) 
-2.998*  
(.0027) 
AR2 -1.0256 
 (.3051) 
-1.2506  
(.2111) 
-1.239  
(.2152) 
-1.056  
(.2908) 
-1.123  
(.2612) 
Sargan test chi2(29) = 
25.64 
 
chi2(28) = 
25.17 
chi2(27) = 
23.75 
chi2(27) = 
27.85 
Chi2(27) = 
27.77 
No. of groups 57 57 57 57 57 
No. of instruments 38 38 38 39 40 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
ROA is Return on Assets (Net income/Total Assets), ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is 
Total Capital, Lev is financial leverage (Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), GDPG is 
the GDP growth ((GDP current year – GDP previous year)/GDP previous year), Inf is the inflation as percentage 
of GDP, Age is the firm age, BoardSize is no. of board members, CR is the credit risk measured as provision for 
loan loss to total loan (Loan loss provision/total loan ) and IB is the Islamic bank dummy variable. 
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Table 9. Determinants of Profitability (ROE) 
Dep: ROE Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E 
Dependent L1 .266* 
(.000) 
.2763* 
(.000) 
.2685* 
(.000) 
.2386*  
(.004) 
.2153**  
(.024) 
Dependent L2 -.017  
(.817) 
-.0424  
(.583) 
-.0299 
 (.669) 
-.0312  
(.588) 
-.0215 
 (.686) 
ESG 
L1 
28.767 
 (.212) 
-47.35*  
(.009) 
13.286  
(.437) 
-35.796** 
(.018) 
19.511  
(.344) 
-33.99*** 
(.099) 
6.909  
(.641) 
-31.56**  
(.032) 
5.515  
(.749) 
-32.21**  
(.011) 
TC 1.553 
 (.109) 
3.9055** 
(.010) 
4.128* 
(.008) 
2.9003**  
(.023) 
2.868**  
(.021) 
Lev .4645 
 (.372) 
.4856  
(.330) 
.5653  
(.176) 
.4061 
 (.429) 
.335 
 (.582) 
LD -.0507  
(.122) 
-.0488*** 
(.062) 
-.0361** 
(.025) 
-.0222**  
(.023) 
-.021** 
 (.034) 
GDPG .0637  
(.449) 
.0621  
(.385) 
.0622 
 (.367) 
.0469  
(.481) 
.036  
(.531) 
Inf .069** 
(.035) 
.0745** 
(.015) 
.0815** 
(.012) 
.0441  
(.121) 
.046*** 
 (.063) 
Age - -5.474** 
(.022) 
-.4818  
(.904) 
-1.413  
(.743) 
.972  
(.889) 
BoardSize - - -10.417  
(.126) 
-1.835 
 (.738) 
-4.975 
 (.613) 
CR - - - -2.866* 
 (.005) 
-3.053*  
(.007) 
IB - - - - 5.227  
(.824) 
AR1 -2.331**  
(.0195) 
-2.441** 
 (.0147) 
-2.391** 
(.0168) 
-2.481** 
(.0131) 
-2.495**  
(.0126) 
AR2 -1.1618  
(.2453) 
-1.1957 
 (.2318) 
-1.2992  
(.1939) 
-1.2463  
(.2127) 
-1.225  
(.2206) 
Sargan test chi2(29) = 
27.44 
chi2(28) = 
22.03 
chi2(27) = 
21.27 
chi2(27) = 
22.26 
Chi2(27) = 
24.23 
No. of groups 57 57 57 57 57 
No. of 
instruments 
38 38 38 39 40 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
ROE is return on equity (Net income/equity), ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, 
Lev is financial leverage (Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), GDPG is the GDP growth 
((GDP current year – GDP previous year)/GDP previous year), Inf is the inflation as percentage of GDP, Age is the firm 
age, BoardSize is no. of board members, CR is the credit risk measured as provision for loan loss to total loan (Loan loss 
provision/total loan ) and IB is the Islamic bank dummy variable.. 
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Table 10. Determinants of Profitability (Tobin’s Q) 
Dep: TobQ Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E 
Dependent L1 .2338*  
(.004) 
.212** 
 (.010) 
.0667 
 (.484) 
.0711  
(.464) 
.1331 
 (.281) 
Dependent L2 .1486* 
 (.001) 
.1283**  
(.042) 
-.0414 
 (.559) 
-.0409  
(.566) 
-.008  
(.920) 
ESG 
 
L1 
.3824  
(.172) 
-.5575** 
(.044) 
.3814  
(.188) 
-.609** 
(.030) 
-.2654  
(.294) 
-.6622* 
(.009) 
-.2636 
 (.291) 
-.6624** 
 (.010) 
.0145 
 (.957) 
-.694* 
 (.001) 
TC .0773*  
(.000) 
.0701* 
 (.001) 
.0630* 
 (.001) 
.0612* 
(.001) 
.0593*  
(.004) 
Lev .0022 
 (.697) 
.0022 
 (.703) 
-.0018 
 (.747) 
-.0019  
(.721) 
-.0005  
(.918) 
LD -.00022 
 (.563) 
-.0001 
 (.798) 
-.00032  
(.543) 
-.00032  
(.532) 
-.0004  
(.452) 
GDPG -.00002 
 (.988) 
.00018 
 (.873) 
-.0007 
 (.433) 
-.0007 
 (.417) 
-.0008 
 (.440) 
Inf .00123* 
 (.005) 
.00114** 
(.017) 
.00039 
 (.237) 
.0004 
 (.261) 
.0006*** 
 (.065) 
Age - .0305  
(.631) 
-.0471  
(.449) 
-.0445 
 (.470) 
-.0463 
 (.485) 
BoardSize - - .3974* 
(.001) 
.3998* 
 (.001) 
.3462* 
 (.005) 
CR - - 
 
-.0026 
 (.658) 
-.0024  
(.673) 
IB - - - - -.1801 
 (.553) 
AR1 -1.4762 
 (.1399) 
-1.51 
 (.1310) 
-.5535 
 (.5799) 
-5533  
(.5801) 
-.9106  
(.3625) 
AR2 -1.4751  
(.1402) 
-1.4213  
(.1552) 
-.7147  
(.4748) 
-.7027  
(.4823) 
-.763 
 (.4455) 
Sargan test Chi2(29) 
=45.33 
 
chi2(28) = 
44.53 
 
chi2(27) = 
29.40 
 
chi2(27) = 
28.99 
Chi2(27) = 
31.33 
No. of groups 57 57 57 57 57 
No. of 
instruments 
38 38 38 39 40 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
TobQ: refers to Tobin’s Q, ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, Lev is financial leverage 
(Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), GDPG is the GDP growth ((GDP current year – GDP previous 
year)/GDP previous year), Inf is the inflation as percentage of GDP, Age is the firm age, BoardSize is no. of board members, CR 
is the credit risk measured as provision for loan loss to total loan (Loan loss provision/total loan ) and IB is the Islamic bank 
dummy variable. 
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6.6.2. Results of the Effect of Bank Profitability on ESG Disclosure 
This section aims to answer our third research question, “Do profitable banks engage 
more in ESG”?  In addition, we can determine in this regression the main factors that 
affect the decision of banks to engage in ESG. 
Table 11 illustrates the results of our econometric model (equation 2). We run stepwise 
regression, adding one variable at a time, to see the effect of adding these variables on 
the ESG disclosure. Table 11 panel A shows the results of regressing bank size, 
leverage, loan to deposit ratios and firm age on ESG. 
Results suggest that ESG disclosure among banks persists significantly for two years. 
It means that banks that disclosed ESG related information in a year tend to continue 
this practice in the upcoming years. The coefficient on the ROA is positive and 
significant at 5% level and the coefficient of ROA lag 1 period is also significant at 5% 
level, but affects ESG negatively. It indicates that profitable banks tend to have high 
ESG disclosures in the same year however, their disclosure would decrease slightly in 
the year that follows. It implies that in the GCC market, banks with high profitability 
are highly visible in the market, thus, they disclose more ESG information to meet the 
social norms (Chakroun et a., 2017). However, to increase short term profitability 
managers tend to cut short expenses for ESG resulting in negative relationship between 
ESG and previous year ROA (Bussoli & Conte, 2018). Our results are consistent with 
the findings of Jizi et al. (2014), Rogosic (2014), Shukla (2017) and Bussoli & Conte 
(2018). However, inconsistent with findings of Qui et al. (2016) who found profitable 
firms to disclose more information in the following year.  
Bank size did not affect ESG disclosure, contrary to the idea that large banks face 
immense pressure to disclose more ESG related information (Martínez-Ferrero, 2015). 
Leverage has no effect on ESG; however, the relationship is negative. It indicates that 
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firms with high debt levels tend to reduce their transparency and disclosure (Solomon 
& Lewis, 2002). We also find liquidity to be insignificant in explaining the ESG 
disclosure. Our result is inconsistent with El-Bannany (2007) and Wu & Shen (2013). 
Furthermore, bank age does not affect ESG disclosure as well. Our result is consistent 
with Sukcharoensin (2012), D’Amico et al. (2016) and Mdolo et al. (2018).  
In Table 11, panel B, we added board size as an explanatory variable to examine 
changes in the relationship between profitability and ESG. We find no effect on our 
model and the results remained the same in terms of significance and directional effect. 
Table 11, panel C includes an additional explanatory variable i.e. government 
ownership. We find no significant effect on the overall results of the regression. 
Furthermore, in table 11, panel D we added our dummy variable IB to check the 
difference in Islamic and conventional banks in terms of effect of profitability on ESG. 
Our results remain persistent and hence, the only variable explaining the change in ESG 
disclosure seems to be the bank’s profitability (ROA). Other variables included in the 
regression did not have any significant effect on ESG disclosure. 
We tested our model for serial correlation and validity of the instruments. As evident 
from table 11 our model is valid and consistent.  
As mentioned earlier, we use two additional measures of profitability namely; ROE and 
Tobin’s Q. Table 12 depicts results for profitability (ROE) and ESG. We find similar 
results for ROE and ROA in relation to ESG, except that previous year’s ROE did not 
have any significant effect on ESG. It is inconsistent with the idea that past profitability 
affects social disclosure (Pirsch et al., 2007). Moreover, other variables remain 
insignificant in explaining the ESG disclosure. 
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Table 13 outlines the effect of Tobin’s Q on ESG. Our findings suggest that there is no 
significant effect of Tobin’s Q on ESG. Since, Tobin’s Q is a market-based measure 
(Bidhari et al., 2013), our results could indicate ineffectiveness of stakeholder pressure 
on the GCC banks. It means that management of GCC banks prioritize the existing 
shareholder value as viewed by agency theory, and care less about the market 
perception of the bank. This is inconsistent with the notion developed by stakeholder 
theory that profitability affects social disclosure (Pirsch et al., 2007). In table 13, panel 
B, our results indicate that board size is significantly affecting ESG disclosure. Our 
result is consistent with Esa & Ghazali (2012), Frias-Aceituno et al. (2013) and Kilic et 
al (2015). Table 13, panel C, shows that after adding government ownership as an 
explanatory variable, liquidity (L/D) tends to significantly and negatively affect the 
ESG disclosure among banks. Our result is consistent with El-Bannany (2007) and Wu 
& Shen (2013) who also found inverse relation between liquidity and ESG. Moreover, 
table 13, panel D shows no significant difference between   Islamic and conventional 
banks in terms of the effect of profitability (Tobin’s Q) on ESG.  
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Table 11. Determinants of ESG (using ROA) 
Dep: ESG Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D 
Dependent L1 .5307* 
(.000) 
.5445* 
(.000) 
.5458* 
(.000) 
.5244* 
(.000) 
Dependent L2 .1946** 
(.020) 
.1806** 
(.032) 
.1748** 
(.045) 
.1955** 
(.035) 
ROA 
L1 
.0284** 
(.015) 
-.0234** 
(.035) 
.0281** 
(.015) 
-.022** 
(.039) 
.068** 
(.016) 
-.0196*** 
(.063) 
.0232** 
(.032) 
-.0183*** 
(.078) 
TC .0059  
(.543) 
.0054  
(.585) 
.0074  
(.566) 
.0062  
(.708) 
Lev -.0033  
(.253) 
-.003  
(.296) 
-.0029 
 (.285) 
-.0027  
(.315) 
LD .00006 
 (.537) 
.00004  
(.772) 
.00001  
(.936) 
.00002 
 (.867) 
Age .0076  
(.756) 
-.0071  
(.773) 
-.0149  
(.663) 
-.0138  
(.859) 
BoardSize - .02466  
(.551) 
.0281  
(.513) 
.0365  
(.630) 
GovtOwn - - .0001 
 (.739) 
.000127  
(.854) 
IB - - - -.0158  
(.781) 
AR1 -3.3109*  
(.0009) 
-3.3134* 
(.0009) 
-3.19* 
(.0014) 
-3.0163* 
(.0026) 
AR2 -1.1067  
(.2684) 
-1.0545  
(.2917) 
-1.0031 
(.3158) 
-1.1179  
(.2636) 
Sargan test chi2(28) = 
26.956 
  chi2(27) = 
27.695 
chi2(26) = 
26.548 
chi2(25) = 
25.088 
No. of groups 57 57 57 57 
No. of instruments 36 36 36 36 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
ROA refers to return on assets (Net income/Assets), ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is 
Total Capital, Lev is financial leverage (Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), Age is 
the firm age, BoardSize is no. of board members, Govtown is the government ownership in the firm and IB is the 
Islamic bank dummy variable. 
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Table 12. Determinants of ESG (using ROE) 
Dep: ESG Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D 
Dependent L1 .5823* 
(.000) 
.5831* 
(.000) 
.5865* 
(.000) 
.5738* 
(.004) 
Dependent L2 .2368* 
(.005) 
.2303* 
(.005) 
.2315* 
(.003) 
.2526* 
(.007) 
ROE 
L1 
.00464** 
(.047) 
-.0022  
(.142) 
.0043** 
(.024) 
-.0023 
 (.124) 
.0042** 
(.015) 
-.00199  
(.133) 
.0041*** 
(.067) 
-.0022  
(.243) 
TC -.0038  
(.798) 
-.0026 
 (.846) 
-.00067  
(.968) 
-.0123 
 (.248) 
Lev -.0055 
 (.191) 
-.0055  
(.167) 
-.00515  
(.183) 
-.0056  
(.182) 
LD .00009 
 (.502) 
.00008 
 (.645) 
.00007  
(.713) 
.000063  
(.727) 
Age .0236  
(.525) 
.0062  
(.869) 
-.0018  
(.966) 
.0518  
(.425) 
BoardSize - .0265 
 (.595) 
.0284  
(.576) 
-.0168  
(.854) 
GovtOwn - - .00011  
(.779) 
.00018 
 (.704) 
IB - - - .04718  
(.467) 
AR1 -3.02*  
(.0025) 
-3.0776* 
(.0021) 
-3.2195* 
 (.0013) 
-2.8847* 
 (.0039) 
AR2 -1.176 
 (.2396) 
-1.1366  
(.2557) 
-1.1984 
 (.2307) 
-1.287 
 (.1981) 
Sargan test chi2(28) = 
29.081 
chi2(27) = 
28.741 
 
 chi2(26) = 
28.276 
chi2(25) = 
25.643 
No. of groups 57 57 57 57 
No. of instruments 36 36 36 36 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
ROE is return on equity (Net income/equity), ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is Total 
Capital, Lev is financial leverage (Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), Age is the firm 
age, BoardSize is no. of board members, Govtown is the government ownership in the bank and IB is the Islamic 
bank dummy variable. 
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Table 13. Determinants of ESG (using Tobin’s Q) 
Dep: ESG Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D 
Dependent L1 .5993* 
(.000) 
.505* 
(.000) 
.4962* 
(.000) 
.4856* 
(.000) 
Dependent L2 .156* 
 (.006) 
.1777** 
(.042) 
.1621*** 
(.060) 
.1654** 
(.038) 
TobQ 
L1 
.0409  
(.604) 
-.0689 
 (.255) 
-.0404  
(.612) 
-.0553  
(.259) 
-.04816  
(.515) 
-.0576  
(.210) 
-.0707  
(.323) 
-.0458  
(.315) 
TC -.0083  
(.337) 
-.0005  
(.958) 
.003  
(.776) 
.0052  
(.603) 
Lev .0017  
(.363) 
.0009  
(.551) 
.00111  
(.475) 
.0016  
(.339) 
LD -.0001  
(.326) 
-.0001  
(.134) 
-.0001*** 
(.071) 
-.0001*** 
(.050) 
Age .0391  
(.157) 
-.0126  
(.599) 
-.0212  
(.407) 
-.0228 
 (.389) 
BoardSize - .1036*** 
(.049) 
.1066** 
(.025) 
.1102** 
(.042) 
GovtOwn - - .0003  
(.405) 
.0003 
 (.244) 
IB - - - -.0465  
(.275) 
AR1 -3.157* 
(.0016) 
-3.0215* 
(.0025) 
-3.0319* 
(.0024) 
-3.0327* 
(.0024) 
AR2 -1.79*** 
(.0734) 
-1.58  
(.1141) 
-1.5085  
(.1314) 
-1.5559  
(.1197) 
Sargan test chi2(28) = 
32.488 
chi2(27) = 
27.891 
chi2(26) = 
27.034 
chi2(25)=24.088 
No. of groups 57 57 57 57 
No. of instruments 36 36 36 36 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
TobQ refers to Tobin’s Q, ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, Lev is 
financial leverage (Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), Age is the firm age, BoardSize 
is no. of board members, Govtown is the government ownership in the firm and IB is the Islamic bank dummy 
variable. 
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We developed two hypotheses to examine the bi-directional relationship between 
profitability and ESG. Hypothesis H2a stated that high ESG disclosures leads to high 
banks’ profitability while hypothesis H2b stated that high profitable firms have high 
ESG disclosures. As seen from the results, we found no significant effect of ESG 
disclosures on bank profitability at the same year. However, previous year’s ESG 
disclosure had negative effect on current year’s profitability as explained by the 
increased cost of disclosures. On the other hand, our results indicate that banks with 
high profits have high ESG at the same year. Therefore, based on the results presented 
we can affirm that our research hypothesis H2a is rejected while H2b is verified. 
6.6 Robustness Checks: 
As part of robustness checks we made several additional tests to affirm our results. 
Firstly, we examined the regression models separately for Islamic and Conventional 
banks. This helps us in determining the accuracy of the results that we obtained earlier 
by using interaction variable of IBs. It also helps in finding if the determinants of 
profitability differ among both types of banks. Secondly, we implemented three extra 
profitability measures to check the accuracy of the results. This helps in gaining insight 
about other profitability measures that could be determining ESG. The three extra 
profitability measures used were namely; interest income, non-interest income and 
price to book ratio (Wu & Shen, 2013; Marsat & Williams, 2011). 
We found that the results are quite similar to those done for all banks together 
(Appendix C, table C1 and C2). In case of CBs and IBs the ESG did not seem to affect 
the bank’s ROA, whereas, for all banks’ collective regression, ESG affected ROA. 
However, for CBs, inflation has effect on ROA and for IBs liquidity risk and credit risk 
affected ROA. Secondly, ESG of previous year had a negative and significant effect on 
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ROE of CBs and IBs. Leverage and inflation of CBs significantly affected the ROE, 
whereas, liquidity and credit risk affected the ROE of IBs significantly. Lastly, Tobin’s 
Q for CBs was affected by their size, liquidity and board size, while for IBs the only 
determinants were size and leverage. 
We tested the differences in determinants of ESG disclosure in both types of banks 
(Appendix C, table C3 & C4). We found that in CBs, ROA had a positive and 
significant effect on ESG, whereas Tobin’s Q lagged one period had a negative and 
significant effect on ESG disclosure. Board size affected in both types of banks’ ESG. 
No other variable affected the ESG disclosures of IBs.  
With regards to the additional profitability measures used in the study, we find that only 
non-interest income is affected positively by ESG disclosure (Appendix C, table C5). 
Wu & Shen (2013) suggested that high ESG disclosures tend to attract customers thus, 
increasing the non-interest income. We next tested the effect of these three profitability 
measures on ESG (Appendix C, table C6). We found that lag1 interest income affects 
the ESG disclosures negatively. It means that banks who had high interest income their 
disclosures were low in the year that followed. However, banks who had high interest 
income also had higher disclosures in the current year. This could imply that banks 
spend on ESG activities in the same year in which they had high interest income, 
consequently, they did not have sufficient to spend in the next year. We further note 
that non-interest income is insignificantly related to ESG disclosures. Thus, we can 
deduce that banks in the GCC rely more on their interest income to use for ESG 
activities as suggested by the regression results. Furthermore, with regards to price-to-
book ratio, we found that the previous year’s price-to-book ratio is significant and 
negatively related to ESG disclosures. This could imply that in order to maintain the 
positive market value, bank managers tend to reduce their costs, by cutting off extra 
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activities (including ESG activities). This is also evident from table C5 (Appendix C) 
wherein, price-to-book ratio Persists over the years. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this section, we will provide summary and conclusions for the thesis. First, a brief 
background of the study is provided, followed by the approach taken to answer the 
research questions. Second, we discuss the results attained in the research. Third, we 
outline the limitations that we countered during the course of research and provide 
suggestions for future research. Finally, the research is concluded with important 
contributions made by this study and Policy implications. 
7.1 Summary and Conclusions 
VD is increasingly becoming important for banks, as it ensures stakeholders that 
sufficient transparency is maintained by the bank. Furthermore, most of the importance 
adhering to VD is due to its linkage with improved profitability (Mardini, 2015). Since 
the link could move from ESG to profitability, as well as, from profitability to ESG, we 
study the bi-directional relationship between ESG and bank profitability. The thesis 
studies this link under two prominent theories namely; the stakeholder theory and the 
agency theory. This study is applied to a sample of 57 Islamic and conventional banks 
operating in the GCC region. This helps to examine the similarities and/ or the 
differences in the way ESG disclosures react to profitability (and vice-versa) for both 
types of banks. Furthermore, we examine the extent of ESG disclosure in both banks. 
Most of previous studies found that disclosure by IBs was poor as compared to their 
counterparts, while other studies found no link between profitability and ESG (Masruki 
et al., 2012; Mosaid Boutti, 2012; Zubairu et al., 2012; Nobanee & Ellili, 2016; 
Platonova et al., 2018). However, these studies have severe limitations. Some of the 
studies had limited number of banks taken into account, while, some had short sample 
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period. This thesis extends the existing literature by including all banks in the GCC 
(with available data) for a sample period of 11 years (2007-2011).  
To test our hypotheses, and to ensure efficiency of the results, we employed the System 
General Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator.  
The empirical findings suggest that IBs level of ESG disclosures is lower than that of 
CBs. Hassan & Hrahap (2010) suggested that IBs do not give much importance to VD, 
thus, their disclosure levels are low. The thesis results also provide evidence that IBs 
are not compatible with their main purpose of establishment i.e. to be socially 
responsible (Yusoff et al., 2013). Our regression results for GCC banks suggest that 
ESG disclosures of previous year affects negatively bank profitability of the current 
year. It implies that spending on ESG is costly for GCC banks. We also found that high 
profitable banks tend to disclose more information than non-profitable ones which 
implies that profitable banks are visible in the market, thus, they disclosure more 
information to maintain their image.  
To check the robustness of our results, we tested the data using additional profitable 
measures. Using price-to-book ratio, we found that previous year’s price-to-book ratio 
affected the current year’s ESG disclosure negatively. It could imply that managers 
wish to maintain the profitable image of their banks, thus, cutting off costs that are spent 
on voluntary activities. This would lower the ESG disclosures and reduce the cost 
burden on the bank income. Eventually, leading to steady or improved market 
performance of banks.  
We also rerun our regressions separately for IBs and CBs. We found that profitability 
does not seem to affect either of the banks’ ESG disclosures. However, for both the 
banks, ROE of previous year had significant effect on current year’s ESG disclosure. 
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With regards to ESG, it remained unaffected by any profitable measure in IBs, whereas, 
ROA and Tobin’s Q had significant effect on ESG disclosures in CBs.  
During the course of the research, we faced certain limitations that could be addressed 
in future research studies. Firstly, several banks had missing data which led to their 
exclusion from the sample. This also led to reduction in the number of Islamic banks 
that were included in the study. It certainly portrays that banks in the GCC region care-
less about their stakeholders or/and perhaps there is lack of pressure from the 
stakeholders to disclose information. Secondly, there is dearth of studies in the context 
of GCC related to ESG that explain the issues of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity. 
This limits our alternatives towards countering these issues in the study. Furthermore, 
it also questions the results of past studies since ESG and profitability are likely to be 
endogenously determined. Thirdly, there is inconsistency in the way data is disclosed 
by the banks in the GCC. Some of them have separate reports for financial statements, 
sustainability reporting and corporate governance reporting, while others have all this 
information in one annual report. It results in difficulties while collecting data since 
some of them have governance related information in the annual report, but they have 
no information regarding ESG. It is sometimes disclosed in the news section of the 
websites. Moreover, the information regarding banks disclosed in the GCC region 
appears biased since the only source of data collection is company websites and annual 
reports. They will certainly disclose information that is in their best interest. However, 
there is scarce or no information regarding the negatives of the banks. For instance, the 
controversies facing the banks, the ill effects of their investments on environment and 
other similar information. This limits our study as we are unable to analyse the negative 
side of the banking industry in the GCC region. Fourthly, our VD measure is limited to 
ESG information. There could possibly be other VD that affect the profitability of the 
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firms. Future studies can include other voluntary information such as those related to 
risk, intellectual capital, future prospects, management discussions and other non-
financial information that could affect decision making. Apart from being limited to 
ESG information, our study uses a specific ESG index adopted from Eikon Thomson 
Reuters, future studies can develop an index on own that is much relevant to the GCC 
market. Furthermore, research studies can employ different estimators to counter the 
issues of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity. This will help in comparing and 
contrasting the results and the reliability of estimators. Lastly, future studies can also 
include additional control measures that could affect the ESG/profitability of the firms 
such as expenses, governance factors and institutional factors.  
Regardless of the aforementioned limitations, this thesis has many contributions.  First, 
it enhances the literature on Islamic and Conventional banks with regards to ESG 
disclosure and profitability. Second, this study is also the first to employ two-step 
dynamic system GMM estimator in the GCC region to study the bi-directional relation 
between ESG and profitability. Third, contrary to previous studies, we based our ESG 
index on comprehensive collected data from different sources and not just from banks’ 
annual reports.  
Since, more information is essential to reduce the level of asymmetric information 
between managers, bank owners and depositors. This study is also useful for all the 
stakeholders and especially the investors. It will guide them in decision making as the 
market is expanding and it is essential that sufficient information is made available in 
order to facilitate their investment decisions. This study will have policy implications 
to regulators of the banking sector in the GCC countries.   Given our results that ESG 
is costly to the banking sector, there will be no incentives for banks to engage in ESG 
activities.  Therefore, our results are expected to assist policy makers to formulate 
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policies based on the level of disclosures made by banks, such as setting up new policies 
that would lead to greater board monitoring, which in turn lead to increased VD. This 
study also helps managers to manage their budgets efficiently, to invest accordingly in 
the ESG activities and to balance the interests of various stakeholders. Our research 
paves way for further studies to be conducted in the context of Islamic banks and 
conventional banks in relation to VD.  
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Appendix 
Appendix (A) 
Table A1. Summarized relationship between CSR and financial profitability 
Author and 
year 
Research context Variables Findings 
Cornett et al. 
(2016) 
US Profitability: ROA, 
ROE, operating 
profit, Tobin’s Q 
CSR: ESG MSCI 
database 
Profitability +ve 
related to CSR 
Shen et al. 
(2016) 
Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, UK etc. 
Profitability: ROA, 
ROE, net interest 
income, non-
interest income 
CSR: 
FTSE4GOOD 
index 
Profitability +ve 
related to CSR 
Matuszak & 
Rozanska 
(2017) 
Poland Profitability: ROA, 
ROE 
CSR: Content 
analysis 
Profitability +ve 
related to CSR 
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Awan & 
Nazish (2016)  
Pakistan Profitability: ROA, 
ROE, EPS 
CSR: content 
analysis 
Profitability +ve 
related to CSR 
Ashraf et al., 
(2017) 
Pakistan & 
Bangladesh 
Profitability: ROA, 
ROE, EPS, P/E 
CSR: content 
analysis 
Profitability +ve 
related to CSR 
Niresh & Silva 
(2018) 
Sri Lanka Profitability: ROA, 
ROE 
CSR: content 
analysis 
Profitability +ve 
related to CSR 
Maqbool & 
Zameer (2018) 
India Profitability: ROA, 
ROE, Net profit, 
CSR: content 
analysis 
Profitability +ve 
related to CSR 
Bussoli & 
Conte (2018) 
Europe Profitability: 
ROAA (average 
assets) 
CSR: Thomson 
Reuters ESG 
rating 
Profitability +ve 
related to CSR 
CSR negative 
related to 
profitability 
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Jizi et al. 
(2014) 
US Profitability: ROA 
CSR: content 
analysis 
CSR +ve related to 
profitability 
Rogosic (2014) Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 
Croatia and 
Montenegro 
Profitability: Gross 
profit 
CSR: Global 
reporting index 
CSR +ve related to 
profitability 
Shukla (2017) India Profitability: profit 
after tax, ROA, 
ROE, Market 
capitalization 
CSR: content 
analysis 
CSR +ve related to 
profitability 
Dell’Atti et al. 
(2017) 
Global financial 
banking industry 
report 
75 international 
banks 
Profitability: EPS, 
CSR: Thomson 
Reuters ESG 
rating 
Reputation: 
Reputation 
institute 
Profitability +ve 
related to reputation 
Reputation +ve 
related to CSR  
Deutsch & 
Pinter (2016) 
Hungary Profitability: ROA, 
ROE 
Profitability –ve 
related to CSR 
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CSR: content 
analysis 
Chakroun et al. 
(2017) 
Tunisia Profitability: ROE 
CSR: content 
analysis 
Profitability –ve 
related to CSR 
Fijalkowska et 
al. (2018) 
Central and eastern 
Europe 
Profitability: ROA, 
ROE 
CSR: content 
analysis 
No relation 
 
Table A2. Summary of CSR in Islamic banks 
Author and 
year 
Context Variables Findings 
Zubairu et al. 
(2012) 
Saudi Arabia - IBs have poor 
disclosures,  
IBs and CBs have 
similar CSR items 
disclosed 
Aribi & Gao 
(2010) 
GCC - IBs disclose more 
required by AAOIFI.  
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Mallin et al. 
(2014) 
13 countries 
Bahrain, Bangladesh 
Indonesia, 
Jordan, 
Kuwait, 
Malaysia, 
Pakistan, 
Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Syria, UAE, 
UK 
Profitability: 
ROA, ROE 
CSR: content 
analysis 
IBs disclose more 
required by AAOIFI. 
CSR +ve related to 
profitability 
Platonova et al. 
(2018) 
GCC (excluding 
Oman) 
Profitability: 
ROA, ROE 
CSR: content 
analysis 
Level of CSR in IBs 
below expectations 
Profitability +ve 
related to CSR 
 
Ahmed et al. 
(2012) 
Bangladesh Profitability: 
ROA, 
Profitability +ve 
related to CSR 
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CSR: content 
analysis 
Nobanee & 
Ellili (2016) 
UAE Profitability: 
Growth of short-
term deposits 
CSR: content 
analysis 
Profitability not 
affected by CSR 
Mosaid & 
Boutti (2012) 
8 banks (GCC) Profitability: 
ROA, ROE 
CSR: content 
analysis 
CSR not affected by 
profitability 
 
Masruki et al. 
(2012) 
Malaysia Profitability: 
ROA 
CSR: content 
analysis 
CSR not affected by 
profitability 
CSR affected by bank 
size 
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Table A3. Dimensions of ESG 
 
No. of items in 
index 
Environment 33 
Resource Use 9 
Emissions 17 
Innovation 7 
Social  38 
Workforce 20 
Human Rights 4 
Community 10 
Product 
responsibility 
4 
Governance 44 
Management 32 
Shareholders 10 
CSR strategy 2 
Total 115 
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Table A4. ESG index breakdown 
A. Environment 
 
I. Resource Use targets water efficiency, targets 
energy efficiency, Environment 
management, renewables energy 
use, energy use total, indirect energy 
use, electricity purchased, green 
buildings, water use 
   
II. Emissions  Biodiversity impact reduction, CO2 
equivalent emissions total, Carbon 
offsets, co2 estimation method, 
climate change commercial risk 
opportunities, ozone depleting 
substances, Sox emissions, waste 
total, waste recycled total, 
hazardous waste, waste reduction 
initiatives, e-waste reduction, water 
discharged, ISO 14001/EMS 
(environment management strategy), 
accidental spills, environmental 
provisions, environmental 
investments 
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III. Innovation Eco-design products, fleet fuel 
consumption, equator principles, 
environmental project financing, 
nuclear, organic products initiatives, 
renewable/clean energy products 
   
B Social 
 
I. Workforce  Health and safety policy, training 
and development policy, policy 
skills training, policy career 
development, policy diversity and 
opportunity, OHSAS 18001, 
employee satisfaction, salaries and 
wages, net employment creation, 
number of employees, turnover of 
employees, women employees, 
employees with disabilities, total 
injury rate, accidents total, 
employee fatalities, lost days, 
average training hours, training 
costs, diversity and opportunity, 
   
II. Human Rights Human rights policy, Policy 
freedom of association, Policy child 
labor, Policy forced labor 
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III. Community Policy fair competition, policy 
bribery and corruption, policy 
business ethics, policy community 
involvement, whistleblower 
protection, OECD guidelines, 
extractive industries transparency 
initiative, total donations, employee 
engagement voluntary, corporate 
responsibility awards  
   
IV. Product responsibility quality management systems, ISO 
9000-9001, Six sigma, Customer 
satisfaction 
   
C. Governance 
 
I. Management Board functions policy, corporate 
governance board committee, 
Nomination board committee, audit 
board committee, 
remuneration/compensation board 
committee, board structure policy, 
Board size, Board independence, 
Board diversity, Board experience, 
executive compensation, executive 
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retention, internal audit department 
reporting, external consultants, audit 
committee independence, 
compensation committee 
independence, compensation 
committee nonexecutive members, 
remuneration committee non-
executive, nomination committee  
independence, board attendance, 
number of board meetings, board 
meeting attendance, committee 
meeting attendance, board size more 
ten less eight, board size, board 
background and skills, board 
specific skills, average board tenure, 
nonexecutive board members, 
independent board members, board 
individual reelection,  
   
II. Shareholders Shareholders rights policy, policy 
equal voting rights, policy 
shareholder engagement, state 
owned enterprise SOE, classified 
board structure, elimination of 
cumulative voting rights, Pre-
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emptive rights, non-audit to audit 
fees ratio, auditor independence 
rotation, insider dealing 
   
III. CSR strategy CSR sustainability committee, 
Global Impact 
   
 
Table A5. Samples used in the study 
Country Islamic Banks Conventional 
Banks 
Total 
Saudi Arabia 4 7 11 
Bahrain 5 3 8 
Kuwait 4 5 9 
Qatar 3 5 8 
UAE 9 6 15 
Oman 2 4 6 
Total 22 35 57 
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Table A6. Total Banks distribution in GCC (Listed on stock exchange) 
Country Islamic Banks Conventional 
Banks 
Total 
Saudi Arabia 4 7 11 
Bahrain 5 3 8 
Kuwait 4 5 9 
Qatar 3 5 8 
UAE 9 15 24 
Oman 4 4 8 
Total 29 39 68 
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Table A7. List of all banks in the GCC 
Saudi Arabia banks list: 
A. Islamic Banks: 
1. Al Rajhi Bank 
2. Bank Bilad 
3. Bank AlJazira 
4. Alinma Bank 
B. Conventional banks: 
1. Arab National Bank 
2. Riyad Bank 
3. Samba Bank 
4. Banque Saudi Fransi 
5. Alawwal Bank 
6. Saudi Investment Bank 
7. National Commercial Bank 
Bahrain banks list: 
A. Islamic Banks 
1. Khaleeji Commercial Bank - listed 
2. Ithmaar Bank - Listed 
3. Al Salam Bank - Listed 
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4. Bahrain Islamic Bank – Listed 
5. Ahli United Bank 
B. Conventional Banks: 
1. Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait (BBK) 
2. Barka Bank 
3. National Bank of Bahrain 
Kuwait Banks list: 
A. Islamic Banks: 
1. Boubyan bank 
2. Al Ahli United bank 
3. International Bank of Kuwait 
4. Kuwait Finance House 
B. Conventional Banks: 
1. National Bank of Kuwait 
2. Gulf Bank 
3. Commercial Bank of Kuwait 
4. Al-Ahli Bank of Kuwait 
5. Burgan Bank 
Qatar Banks list: 
A. Islamic Banks: 
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1. Qatar Islamic Bank 
2. Qatar International Islamic Bank 
3. Masraf Al Rayan 
B. Conventional Banks 
1. Qatar National bank 
2. Commercial Bank of Qatar 
3. Doha Bank 
4. Ahli Bank 
5. Al Khalij Commercial Bank 
United Arab Emirates Banks list: 
A. Islamic Banks: 
1. Al Salam Bank 
2. Emirates Islamic Bank 
3. Dubai Islamic Bank 
4. Ajman Bank 
5. Abu Dhabi commercial bank 
6. AL Salam Sudan 
7. Al Baraka Banking Group 
8. Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 
9. Sharjah Islamic Bank 
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B. Conventional Banks: 
1. Commercial Bank of Dubai 
2. Bank of Sharjah 
3. Commercial bank international 
4. Emirates NBD 
5. First Abu dhabi bank 
6. Investment Bank 
7. Mashreqbank 
8. National Bank Fujairah 
9. Ras Al Khaima Bank 
10. Umm Qawain Bank 
11. United Arab Bank 
Oman Banks List: 
A. Islamic Banks: 
1. Bank Muscat 
2. National Bank of Oman 
3. Alizz Islamic Bank (not included) 
4. Bank Nizwa. 
B. Conventional Banks: 
1. Sohar Bank 
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2. HSBC Bank Oman 
3. Bank Dhofar 
4. Ahli Bank 
Table A8. Definition of variables 
Characteristic Variable Name Description Source 
Profitability Return on 
Assets 
ROA Net 
income/Total 
assets 
Bloomberg 
 Return on 
Equity 
ROE Net 
income/Common 
equity 
Bloomberg 
 Tobin’s Q TobQ (Market value of 
equity + Book 
value of 
debt)/Book value 
of assets 
Bloomberg 
ESG ESG score ESG No. of keywords 
found in annual 
report/total 
number of words 
Bank 
websites, 
annual 
reports, 
governance 
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reports, CSR 
reports. 
Firm Size Total Capital TC Natural 
logarithm of 
firm’s total 
capital 
Bloomberg 
Financial 
Leverage 
Debt ratio Lev Total book value 
of debt/ Total 
book value of 
assets 
Bloomberg 
Liquidity Loans to 
Deposits 
LD Total 
Loans/Total 
deposits 
Bloomberg 
Macroeconomic 
variables  
GDP growth 
(annual) 
GDPG (GDP current 
year – GDP 
previous 
year)/GDP 
previous year 
Worldbank 
 Inflation GDP 
deflator 
Inf Inflation as 
percentage of 
GDP 
Worldbank  
Firm Age Age of the 
firm 
Age Natural 
logarithm of 
Bank 
website. 
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(2017 - date of 
establishment) 
Governance 
measure 
Board Size Boardsize Natural 
logarithm of no. 
of board 
members on 
board. 
Annual 
reports, 
Gulfbase. 
Risk Credit Risk CR Provision of loan 
loss to total 
loans 
Bloomberg 
Ownership 
concentration 
Government 
ownership 
Govtown Government 
ownership in 
banks 
Bloomberg 
Type of bank Islamic bank IB ESG* (Islamic 
bank – 1, 
Conventional 
bank – 0) 
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Appendix (B) 
Table B1. OLS regression: profitability as dependent variable 
 ROA ROE TobQ 
ESG .4651 (.450) 2.551 (.581) -.327* (.000) 
TC .249* (.000) 2.05* (.000) .021* (.000) 
Lev -.2022* (.000) -.476* (.002) -.0099* (.000) 
LD -.0032* (.039) -.048* (.000) -.0007* (.000) 
GDPG .072* (.000) .4056* (000) .006* (.000) 
Inf .0027 (.524) .0049 (.877) .0004 (.433) 
Age .015 (.871) .8171 (.249) .0244** 
(.036) 
Boardsize .0558 (.810) -1.218 (.486) -.002 (.947) 
CR -.2258* (.000) -1.974* (.000) .005 (.248) 
IB -1.103*** 
(.086) 
.4077 (.933) -.036 (.647) 
No. of 
observations 
627 627 627 
R-Squared .3243 .2334 .1482 
                     *represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
                     ** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
                     ***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
                     ROA refers to return on assets (Net income/Assets), ROE is return on equity (Net income/equity), 
TobQ refers to Tobin’s Q,  ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, 
Lev is financial leverage (Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), GDPG is 
the GDP growth ((GDP current year – GDP previous year)/GDP previous year), Inf is the inflation as 
percentage of GDP, Age is the firm age, BoardSize is no. of board members, CR is credit risk (loan 
loss provision to total loan) and IB is the Islamic bank dummy variable. 
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Table B2. OLS regression: ESG as dependent variable 
 ESG 
ROA .0007 (.441) - - 
ROE - -.0001 (.861) - 
TobQ - - -.1045* (.000) 
TC .0023 (.313) .0027 (.390) .0044 (.136) 
Lev .002 (.132) .0026*** 
(.052) 
.0013 (.306) 
LD -.0001 (.327) -.0001 (.351) -.0002 (.103) 
Age .0083 (.150) -.0093 (.160) -.006 (.297) 
Boardsize .0384* (.000) .067* (.000) .0642* (.000) 
Govtown .0001 (.403) .0001 (.438) .0001 (.505) 
IB -.017** (.020) -.0165** 
(.025) 
-.0165** 
(.021) 
No. of 
observations 
627 627 627 
R-Squared .0523 .0515 .0883 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
ROA refers to return on assets (Net income/Assets), ROE is return on equity (Net income/equity), 
TobQ refers to Tobin’s Q,  ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, 
Lev is financial leverage (Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), Age is the 
firm age, BoardSize is no. of board members and IB is the Islamic bank dummy variable. 
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Table B3. Test for heteroskedasticity 
Dependent 
variable: 
ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
Chi-Squared 39.99 345.33 125.70 
Prob>Chi-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Table B4. Test for endogeneity 
     Independent  
Dependent 
 
ESG TC Lev Liquidity Age Board 
Size 
Credit 
Risk 
GDP 
Growth 
Inflation 
ROA (p-value) 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.031 0.59 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.536 
ROE (p-value) 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.90 
Tobin's Q (p-
value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.98 0.24 0.00 0.43 
*A low p-value for ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q indicates the existence of endogeneity (Chmelarova, 2007). 
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Appendix (C) 
Table C1. Determinants of profitability: Conventional banks 
          Dependent 
Independent 
ROA ROE TobQ 
Dependent L1 .4059* (.000) .2485* (.003) .1695 (.144) 
Dependent L2 .0793*** (.083) .0418** (.034) .0919 (.104) 
ESG 
L1 
4.032 (.190) 
-2.579 (.219) 
11.979 (.291) 
-17.88** (.016) 
-.3203 (.208) 
-.3949 (.171) 
TC .058 (.737) .759 (.534) .043* (.007) 
Lev -.0454 (.643) 1.534* (.000) .002 (.886) 
LD -.0057 (.313) -.043 (.147) -.0013** (.030) 
GDPG -.0015 (.929) -.011 (.911) -.001 (.411) 
Inf .0096** (.035) .0791* (.004) .0003 (.380) 
Age .697 (.154) 4.366 (.568) -.0745 (.270) 
Boardsize -.7085 (.461) -8.98 (.418) .4218* (.006) 
CR -.299 (.119) -1.675 (.166) .003 (.760) 
AR1 -2.3284** (.0199) -1.416 (.1568) -.5875 (.5569) 
AR2 -1.1694 (.2423) -1.591 (.1115) -.3874 (.6985) 
Sargan test chi2(27) = 24.981 chi2(27) = 22.78 Chi2(27) = 24.27 
No. of groups 35 35 35 
No. of 
instruments 
39 39  39 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
ROA refers to return on assets (Net income/Assets), ROE is return on equity (Net income/equity), TobQ refers to 
Tobin’s Q,  ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, Lev is financial leverage 
(Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), GDPG is the GDP growth ((GDP current year – 
GDP previous year)/GDP previous year), Inf is the inflation as percentage of GDP, Age is the firm age, BoardSize 
is no. of board members and CR is credit risk (loan loss provision to total loan). 
130 
 
Table C2. Determinants of profitability: Islamic Banks 
          Dependent 
Independent 
ROA ROE TobQ 
Dependent L1 .2604 (.117) .1388 (.309) .149*** (.386) 
Dependent L2 -.0402 (.796) -.108 (.436) .0232 (.884) 
ESG 
L1 
2.301 (.721) 
-4.53 (.146) 
-6.394 (.841) 
-30.474** (.018) 
-.0368 (.949) 
-.322*** (.364) 
TC .4844 (.232) 2.765 (.267) .0512** (.017) 
Lev -.0137 (.712) .129 (.852) .00622** (.014) 
LD -.0028** (.020) -.022* (.005) -.0004 (.245) 
GDPG .0088 (.558) .1055 (.328) .0004 (.820) 
Inf .0077 (.240) .032 (.488) .0005 (.617) 
Age -.2939 (.711) 4.252 (.583) -.0203 (.851) 
Boardsize -.1328 (.930) -6.747 (.575) .238 (.203) 
CR -.3736** (.049) -3.342** (.014) -.0042 (.660) 
AR1 -2.387** (.0170) -1.5777 (.1146) -.2075 (.8356) 
AR2 -.3355 (.7372) -.1638 (.8699) -1.3493 (.1772) 
Sargan test chi2(27) = 11.938 chi2(27) = 9.077 Chi2(27) = 10.153 
No. of groups 22 22 22 
No. of 
instruments 
39 39 39 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
ROA refers to return on assets (Net income/Assets), ROE is return on equity (Net income/equity), TobQ refers to 
Tobin’s Q,  ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, Lev is financial leverage 
(Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), GDPG is the GDP growth ((GDP current year – 
GDP previous year)/GDP previous year), Inf is the inflation as percentage of GDP, Age is the firm age, BoardSize 
is no. of board members and CR is credit risk (loan loss provision to total loan). 
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Table C3. Determinants of ESG: Conventional Banks 
         Dependent 
Independent 
ESG 
Dependent L1 .4921* (.000) .618* (.001) .3058* (004) 
Dependent L2 .2505* (.001) -.0847 (.736) .0997 (.301) 
ROA 
L1 
.01263** (.032) 
-.011 (.196) 
- - 
ROE 
L1 
- .0038 (.182) 
.0001 (.938) 
- 
TobQ 
L1 
- - -.1156 (.185) 
-.1272** (.040) 
TC .0088 (.371) -.0154 (.391) .0049 (.661) 
Lev -.0044 (.322) .0038 (.254) .0005 (.871) 
LD -.00025 (.473) -.00012 (.219) -.0002 (.633) 
Age -.0435 (.243) -.093 (.528) -.0585 (.196) 
BoardSize .0938 (.216) .1096** (.011) .2535* (.007) 
GovtOwn -.00001 (.999) -.0001 (.688) .001 (.111) 
AR1 -2.517*** (.0118) -2.381** (.0173) -2.3406** (.0193) 
AR2 -1.5745 (.1154) -1.883*** 
(.0597) 
-1.0792 (.2805) 
Sargan test chi2(26) = 22.415 chi2(26) = 
23.086 
Chi2(26) = 25.458 
No. of groups 35 35 35 
No. of instruments 36  36 36 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
ROA refers to return on assets (Net income/Assets), ROE is return on equity (Net income/equity), TobQ refers to 
Tobin’s Q,  ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, Lev is financial leverage 
(Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), Age is the firm age, BoardSize is no. of board 
members and Govtown is the government ownership in the firm. 
  
132 
 
Table C4. Determinants of ESG: Islamic Banks 
          Dependent 
Independent 
ESG 
Dependent L1 .582* (004) .618* (.001) .4942 (.179) 
Dependent L2 -.0086 (.964) -.0847 (.736) -.0631 (.713) 
ROA 
L1 
.0323 (.238) 
-.0123 (.418) 
- - 
ROE 
L1 
- .0038 (.182) 
.0001 (.938) 
- 
TobQ 
L1 
- - -.04376 (.696) 
-.1163 (.291) 
TC -.0156 (.550) -.0155 (.391) .0019 (.935) 
Lev .0021 (.520) .0038 (.254) .0035 (.248) 
LD -.00002 (.828) -.0001 (.219) -.00013** (.018) 
Age -.0278(.809) -.0293 (.528) -.0516 (.527) 
BoardSize .1108 (.215) .1096** (.011) .2156 (.164) 
GovtOwn .0006 (.529) -.0001 (.688) -.0033 (.746) 
AR1 -1.9125*** (.0558) -1.6155 (.1062) -1.3527 (.1761) 
AR2 -.388 (.6980) -.2032 (.8390) -.7514 (.4524) 
Sargan test chi2(26) = 14.688 chi2(26) = 9.795 Chi2(26) = 8.714 
No. of groups 22 22 22 
No. of instruments 36  36 36 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
ROA refers to return on assets (Net income/Assets), ROE is return on equity (Net income/equity), TobQ refers to 
Tobin’s Q,  ESG is Environmental, Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, Lev is financial leverage 
(Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits (total loans/total deposits), Age is the firm age, BoardSize is no. of board 
members and GovtOwn is the government ownership in the firm. 
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Table C5. Effect of ESG on other profitability measures 
          Dependent 
Independent 
Intinc NII Pricetobook 
Dependent L1 .7912* (.000) .4377* (.000) .272** (.028) 
Dependent L2 .0213 (.813) .0091 (.930) .044 (.599) 
ESG 
L1 
.0329 (.639) 
-.0192 (.555) 
.2083*** (.057) 
-.027 (.692) 
.657 (.692) 
-2.622 (.146) 
TC .0063*** (.067) .0184*** (.081) .342** (.046) 
Lev .00056 (.484) -.0001 (.936) -.0128 (.751) 
LD .0001 (.462) .00032** (.034) -.00052 (.777) 
GDPG .0006** (.011) -.0003 (.542) -.0041 (.565) 
Inf -.00007 (.424) .0002 (.281) .0032 (.269) 
Age -.005 (.680) -.0057 (.793) -.926*** (.069) 
Boardsize .033 (.216) .0421 (.421) .893 (.212) 
CR -.0018 (.217) -.0058 (.352) .0074 (.897) 
IB -.0037 (.953) -.201 (.183) -1.055 (.517) 
AR1 -3.037* (.0024) -2.354** (.0186) -1.7177*** (.0858) 
AR2 -.9404 (.3470) .240 (.8100) -1.0333 (.3015) 
Sargan test chi2(27) = 34.088 chi2(27) = 27.884 Chi2(27) = 39.769 
No. of groups 57 57 57 
No. of 
instruments 
40 40 40 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
Intinc is interest income, NII is non-interest income, Pricetobook is the price to book ratio, ESG is Environmental, 
Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, Lev is financial leverage (Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits 
(total loans/total deposits), GDPG is the GDP growth ((GDP current year – GDP previous year)/GDP previous 
year), Inf is the inflation as percentage of GDP, Age is the firm age, BoardSize is no. of board members, CR is 
credit risk (loan loss provision to total loan) and IB is the Islamic bank dummy variable. 
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Table C6. Other profitability measures’ effect on ESG 
          Dependent 
Independent 
ESG 
Dependent L1 .564* (.000) .599* (.000) .5753* (.000) 
Dependent L2 .188* (.002) .1532*** (.070) .1821** (.027) 
Intinc 
L1 
.441** (.029) 
-1.02* (.001) 
 
- 
 
- 
NII 
L1 
 
- 
.175 (.273) 
-.227 (.368) 
 
- 
Pricetobook 
L1 
 
- 
 
- 
.0126 (.469) 
-.0145** (.016) 
TC -.0103 (.602) .0054 (.620) -.0010 (.916) 
Lev -.002 (.775) .001 (.620) .0011 (.640) 
LD -.0001 (.179) -.0002 (.706) -.00004 (.504) 
Age -.0004 (.430) -.0412 (.498) -.0257 (.482) 
BoardSize .2534* (.005) .0941 (.251) .0695 (.261) 
GovtOwn .0004 (.709) .0006 (.582) .00042 (.336) 
IB -.1256 (.351) -.1767 (.174) -.0141 (.357) 
AR1 -3.2114* (.0013) -3.1026* (.0019) -3.0565* (.0022) 
AR2 -1.837*** (.0663) -1.2913 (.1966) -1.451 (.1468) 
Sargan test chi2(26) = 16.294 chi2(26) = 30.321 Chi2(26) = 31.8112 
No. of groups 57 57 57 
No. of instruments 37 37 37 
*represents significance of coefficient at 1% level 
** represents significance of coefficient at 5% level 
***represents significance of coefficient at 10% level 
Intinc is interest income, NII is non-interest income, Pricetobook is the price to book ratio, ESG is Environmental, 
Social & Governance Score, TC is Total Capital, Lev is financial leverage (Debt/Assets), LD is loans to deposits 
(total loans/total deposits), Age is the firm age, BoardSize is no. of board members, GovtOwn is the government 
ownership in the firm and IB is the Islamic bank dummy variable. 
